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ARMS INSPECTION 
Since 1945 hostile gnat p w a r  have been engaged in a minuet 
over disarmament-advancing and retreating but never meeting. 
Central to their division has been the issue of inspection-on one 
side, "no more control than there is disarmament"; on the other, 
"no more disarmament than there is control." Slogans in turn 
have led tu ovdrnplifiation. Inspection is this or that, good or 
bad, necessary or unnecessary. 
The p r e n t  article brings together for the first time the scat- 
tered thoughts of scholars and experts on this complex and little- 
understood issue. It probes beneath the surface to explore such 
questions as: the functions of inspection, the relationship of 
various types of inspection to the objects being inspected, and 
the obsdescence of inspection arrangements under the impact 
of technological change. 
Inspection, the author points out, serves multiple purposes. 
It is a means of detecting violations of an agreement, thus giving 
the victim an opportunity to seek redress. The &reat of detettion 
and of consequent reprisals serves to deter violators. If ade- 
quately devised, inspection can provide reassurance that 'U- is 
well in the inspection system-" Optimally, it can foster a climate 
af confidence that reduces tensions. A given inspection system 
may serve all or only some of these purposes. How many it serves 
is likely to be a compromise between conflicting objectives. The 
goal of perfection, however desirable, is surely unobtainable. Are 
the consequences that flow from no agreement more or less ad- 
verse than from an imperfect system? What are the political as 
well as the security implications? Realistic appraisals involve a 
complex balance sheet of gains and lases. 
The nature of the inspettion rn- d e w  upoa what 
ir bdng inspected: A good model in one instana might be a poaa 
one in another. Nor a n  the extent and depth of inspection be 
necessarily corwlated with the gravity of the threat pooed by a 
particular object. I ' . . 1  + 
Even an inspection system that. ~ a t h k & ~ ; ,  I&= it 
is devised is unlikely to remain so. There is a never ending raa 
between the perfecting of detection and antidetection devices. 
At one time the balance may shift in one direction and at a 
difftfl~en8 time in the ahcr. FuMermore, the objscu e o v d  by 
pn inspmion q p e w n t  may kmme more or lau a n d  U, M- 
*al m r i t y .  M a t d a b  that hold the $rates2 war potential 
todag may tomowau be rhpmeded by .Tachnologid develpp 
manta not anticipated in a givm agxwemt 
%bile such cumirtcratiohs seem rn militate! in favor of totzll 
disarmament and inspection of all maja cxmfwrnenlt of m a -  
me~ts ,  the author pints out that this mdusiaa is now un- 
W h t h  An k p d ~ n  ot adequate to determine that there 
rrm no hidden stockpiles or immmm~ and thar materials wed 
for pe~&tsI  purpose^ were wi being diverted to weapons man* 
ufnet~! would  quire invasion d rovezeignty at ah- 
~ p o l n t i n & e ~ . I n t & c w e n t ~ t e a f d i * N t U  
appun unthinkable. 
, w e s  the ma. ~~ bg chc hptxtion system, it may 
paaq#; hem two .artmmer ,&hrmat rrrsumptiont have ken 
thnt tbc:cp~aan mpst ;be a mm].tiUW w e b  The author, however, 
ationships inmIved uc e, 
,lmm or gmupa of sate4 
oppa&g each 96be# ~ ~ p m a d  hpe&an is easier to Wituts 
~ h c ~  each pcap?i .~~ kdlities rather than having 
to tgrac orn,h+- cr TBir in turn provides an elb 
m a t  olf reas-m NOTS, to the authop; is them amy 
I W S O ~  to am~@e. tbOI & e m  i~vraihbnbk under o reciprocal 
r)atpp M aay lar @&vc :than unda n multilntaPl rystan. 
The p&at =tide mts aiis r.usaful ranindm that inspeaion 
is a continuing problem- abnt. doa not. as is often end 
with signature to an agmment. The importance and complexity 
of the subject justify in our view a treatment of greater length 
and denrity than is usual for International Conciliation. 
LAWRENCE S. FIN-TEIN, Vice-President of the Car- 
negie Endowment for International Peace, prepared this article 
during a year's leave of abanec at the Harvard University Centa 
for International Affairs. The Endowment is grateful to the 
Cater for the opportunity provided Mr. Finkelstein to pursue 
his study of a subject of long-astasrding interest and for the facili- 
ties md cooperation from which he benefited. In addition to 
the pramt article, Mr. Finkelstein has recently published studies 
on "The United Nationr and Organizations for the Control of 
Arrnunen~" in Zntrmatio~l  Organization, "Testing in the At- 
mosphere" in The Nnu Lcadrr, "Defence, Disarmament and 
World Orda" in Behind tk Hdl incs ,  published by the Cana- 
dian Institute of International Affairs, and 'The Uses of Re- 
dprocsl Inspection" in a specid issue of Socdalw. 
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n - Bridge Gulf3 
INSPECTXUN I+ wmy THI. ISSUE on which disagreement has 
been most marlaxi in recent negotiations, bo* on the nuclear 
tat ban and on gcnaal and complete disarmament. British 
Foreign Minister, Home, recently said "bad and back 
again I come to the question of verification as the point on 
which the S U C C ~  or hilur'e of our Conference will tum."l 
The difficult ti& of devising formulas and methods for 
inspection which govaments will consider both adequate 
and acceptable has challenged g9vemment.s as well as others 
concerned with restraining the race and rirducing the 
world's ominow burdux of armaxneqts. In the united States, 
for example, the greatest single research investment in the 
arms control field-with a byiget of $60,000,000 in one year 
dm-has been the Deparwnt of Defense's Project vela 
to examine detection methods to permit adequate supmi- 
I .  
rion of an agreemeot to cease nuclear tests. The task is so 
ddiicult because it must concep itself not only with conflict- 
ing national objcdves with respect tq the inspectit$ arrange 
menti themselves, but also with the intricate interplay of 
iiispection, the arms limitations to be supervised, 'and the 
texture of internatiofial relati~.mhips as they evdlve under 
projected clisammenft pxqpmr. 
It is not merely that the goals of the great powm cox&$ 
today; the Western powers and t&e Compunist powers a% 
trying to negotiate long-knn planj that accommodate the& 
conflicting images of the future as well. The Soviet ~ n i &  
pr~be4;  willingnm tb atcept .csompleu connolr when there 
t cgnp1cte h-,,, but rrfuPer io akep't inspection 
unda a nuclear tat  ban agreement, which involves no actual 
reduction of weapons. Th;&viet position waa recently stated 
&IS: "Aftn the accomplishment of gene* and complete 
dirarmament control will become unrestricfd and compre- 
hensive bcmw then the States will no longer have any&ing 
to hide fro&-. g<* ' p N  Ussp!? f&qp is "no =re 
control than &a+ is diraimament." For the %Vestan powen, 
conapl, Put, progrdvelf, 
an now 'be ~bntkdIled.*~ HOW- 
&r','k.hi~k Mr. p1)idi may be raid. flius to haw p t e d  the 
kknns, the m a g #  ]iq fiat ?&a ~risumrmted: +e can- 
flkting ~lcipru r&t s~&, swit differepce o v a  the 
id le  iiE' i~&tion that ' ad ' amoud of * "crmba1 manlpulatidn 
?a, bti;dge fieni. S& i t  ia' no acc i e t  that &ro\i@~ut 
the b t * &  'hirto~ i# 4fhnh+hi&i heetiitions the partfa 
brire :6ttg'$hi~ed pbphd ta icMxat'c ijbskions ~ te60~81y  
&i$i' bbp'@fie 0ths' $id+, '~ ~ t f t t d  ' i 8 ~ ~ e b y  tmking Q Q ~ G ~ & B ~  
PgssibZi. W'ilC &it', &h'& '$ten as evi&ence &kt t6.i 
#eiat $&k &b'e bi& '&@cidtis in their approach to the 
negotiations, quite the c n&hy T& be true. h ma signify 
#q-gi~it;on 6~ ,&;it hf4  p&, ~O&WC!T the, form o i ape 
ii& m i l  -hi% chma 3' &Wani. hrndamhtal oppiriod 
of in&bs ,ma& I 'i&&lsit&i' , a  - 1 i e i b 1 e . 4  is 
lit& profit in the Lind of. analysis that dapwmtvr how 
e l y  the parties' positions approximate each other on some 
rmttersD6 because invariably the key differences are revealed 
in the language that remains unreconciled, or in what is not 
a i d  What has been true of the disarmament negotiations 
in general has been ate of the inspection issue in paqicular. 
This i s  not to say that th& essential difference cannot be 
resolved; only that they have not been and that resolution 
b not in sight. 
These differences have dominated the postwar negotia- 
tions from the beginning. The first Western proposal with 
regard to inspection, the Baruch Plan, called for international 
"managerial c o n d  ar ownership of all atomic-energy activi- 
ties potentially dangerous to world security. "7 As Bernard 
Baruch made clear, the purpose of such "managerial control 
or ownership" was to ensure agaiwt violation of the basic 
prohibition on "possession or use of an atomic bomb" or of 
the other proposed prohibitions. For the United States, the 
effective institution of an adequate control system was a pre- 
requisite to relinquishment of its atomic weapons and facili- 
ties? Even earlier than the Bamch Plan, in November 1945, 
the heads of government of the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Canada--the three states that had collabo- 
rated in producing the atom bomb-issued a - joint statement 
urging the creation of a United Nations Commission to 
make recommendations mi, inter aliu, "efftxtive safeguards by 
way of inspMion and other means to protect complying 
states against the h;llards of violations and evasions."@ Subse- 
6*, for example, Philip E. acob, "The Disarmament Consensus," Inter- 
national Organircrtia, Vd. d, No. 2 (Spring 1960). pp. 233-260. 
6% Joseph Nogee, 'The Di bwy of Disamament,' International Con- 
cil#atm, No. 526 (Jnnwrg ¶&), pp. 279-289. Jama J. Wadsworth has also 
graphically d&bed how apparent amveqpce of positions conceals differ- 
ences. See The Price of Peace (New York Pmcgeq 191i2), pp. 88-92. 
7 "United States Proposals for the International Control of Atomic Energy: 
Staterpent of United States Representative (Baruch) to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, une 14, 19eg." in U.S. !Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Dkmament  an d Sectsrity; 4 Collection of Documents, 1919-1955 
(Washington: GPO, 1956), p. 191. 
8 Zbid., p. 192, 
9 Zbid., p. 81. J i 
suekt unanimous adoptiob of thh language by the united 
Nations General Assembly1* tempwarily disguised, but did 
not rehove, thi basic disagreement between this pition and 
that of the Soviet Union. -Q* 
he  Soviet emphasis was also established early. The soda 
plan oh atomic energy, introduced in the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, called far renun- 
ciation of the we of atomic weapons, prohibition of produc- 
tion and storing of weapons based on atomic energy, and 
dejtruction of all stocks of atomic weapons within three 
months of the treaty's entry into force. Within six months 
thereafter, according to the Soviet plan, the prties were to 
pass legislation providing penalties for violations." In sub- 
sequent elaborations of this plan it was made clear that the 
Soviet Union would accept controls only after the rrrohibi- 
tions had entered into effect. 
Changing technology and tbe evolution of the negotiations 
themselves have altered, the positions of the partia in many 
fundamental ways. The United States, for example, has-long 
skce abandoned the Baruch propab for ownenhip or man- 
agerial control of atomic facilities. And the Soviet Union 
h a  come a conddaable wly in appearing to a r k n o w 1 ~ c  
the Western, and for many years now9 the United Nations 
majority's, insistence on e,ffective inspection and control as 
P condition £or a r m s  reduction. But the flavor of the original 
pi t ions persists. To this day the West stresses the inspection 
arranpeqw and the Soviet U n i o ~  Lrnphaaizcr the kin& of 
prohibitions to be instituted. 
The issum are real: tbe natiorial iaterests .of the main 
negotiating states conflict on many questions affecting in- 
peaion. The disagreements over inspection are an integral 
part of wider and deeper disagreements over disarmament 
lO"J3stablishment uf a Commission on Atomic Energy: Resolution .of the 
United Nations General Assembly, January 24, 1!346," US. Senate Subcom- 
mittee on the United Nations Charter, Review of the United Nations Chertm: 
A CoClccrim of Documents (Washington: GPO, 1954), p. 427128. 
alPor a description of the Soviet Ian, see B a n h u B ~ .  Bechhoek, Pmt- 
war Negatiationr for rlrw Coatrd &a&bg~n: Bmkings, 1961), pp. 4446. 
8 \ 
d ,it& relation to natkgP1 recmirg, and over the ?place of 
diwipnarnent n @ a h  in relation to national ends. 
Xn a rapidly evd- m t c g i e  and political cnviranmmt, 
the competition of naf&mI interam has generated conflict- 
ing proposals & to rsho b i d  give up wh&t and $0 whgt 
mder. Both have $ought to direct the negotiations along 
paths .most congenial to their paptidar strategic nlvds and 
abilities. Nor h it surprising that this should be 8o; the nee& 
of countries differently situated ore different. Besides, for 
any Igovment  (although .mow for some than for ohen) 
-&g internal agreement on a n ~ i a t h g  initiative lpmt 
k a difticult political maneuvkr. To obtain agreement b n i  
irm~tattd -cia md faatbnsn ammg those who wirh ta 
aqpdate anil &me w b  wopld ptefer to, may well re 
q& d m n m t i c h  at, if tbe proposed initiative h e  
adopted, the country would be better off in relation to its 
potential advemaia tbnh if &gotiat.i,m rooL piace! 
international agrettmats cam tk rrndred whidi do alrot 
,\'.I 
3.7 ~nn&@w inv01~e c o r n m e .  The fact that very little real I iaterntfimai mdiq has ocewrrec.$ in. the p t w a i  d$immwi- 
nrrnt Z W @ . ~ ~ E ~ Q ~  m that the pattia have, until not0 
regarded their in pitions Y king too far apm 
to make ~ t l b l e  agreegarnu possible; And in &e a b n a  
of ~grmnent on what' pnnr the7 hiwe wan& to -redme or 
' d i a ~ t c ,  the great powem have not brm armder gnat pre4 
$&re. t o t  aeek to compromise their differences over inq&ction. 
'&'+hilip ,NdCEBaker, for example, points odt thit ia 1952, and 
fran 1954 to' 1937, the disagreements were : ahat ''subtan- 
zive rnetuum cjf artnameat redu~tion,"~ ra&er lhan abotft 
irtsper:rion -nganmm+. Bemhard Bedrhoefer suggests that 
theSoviet Union ha exploited differences over what is to 
k regulated in or&r to avoid confronting the basic dilem- 
ma$ (dealt with in succeeding paragraphs) that inspection 
, p. 530. Witness Soviet 
Eighteen-Natio? Conkrena: 
the antent a£ ~ c n t "  
pwa for tbat mntry." He points mt that when th nqpEi- 
adons got down to de:tSed maminatim of spec+& s t & .  
-measures to reduce the hazards of surprise aurcL andfithe 
nuclear tat ban-the inspection issue b-e unavoidable 
md viprous dkgrgxrnent soon developed. 
The revase p ib i l i t y  exists, too. Govemmmts unwilling 
to pt down to miour negotiation over what to regulate, 
because for one thing such negotiation might be revealing of 
their ttut stnktqgic concerns, may prefer to disagree on thc 
relatively abstract isrue of inspeaion. It should not be too 
milrpabing if, when aH the documents have been published. 
h out that-,&& United States and the Soviet Union 
ehW at vslrhus point, during the past decade to focus their 
mutt& dbagmemts on ilapeaion. bemuse they were un- 
willing or dot id a poaition to bar* Pkwt whU to be 
.conwdled. I > ,  r (  
The k t  of inrpectian.h;m 2 - D been a convenient vehicle 
fix the Boviet Union. Because inspection is a highly technical 
question, difficult to explain to a world public weary of 
armaments, because to explain it requires more space than 
is available in the normal nswspaper column, the public's 
tendency to oversimplify coanplex issua, is more than-usually 
evident. Thus, the Sovia Union has been able in the past 
to make great pampap& &apitll, out of the more dramtic, 
t& "ban the bomb" approach. Its verbal ,\ 
acceptance sf the. nmwity far a .  'control, its frequent i 
wrtian h recent yean that it wants. inspection and wil l  
accept whatever contr~ls. the Western powers wish when j 
there is g e d .  and brnp1cte dkmnamnt." have tended 1 
-
M DoailEd G. Bi.emak, ed; hinr Conhal, Disarmament, and Nationd Sc- 
mti? (NW YW? B w B  1 ~ 1 ) .  2a-m4. 1 
34 orelpa Minuter hdki  . ~rome;tb recently told the Eighteen-Hation 1 
.Confaenm in Geneva &at: "%he SoUtct Unian wishes to have the mwmary 
- 4  gu;iraptees that fie e3hmame~ obligations that have been agreed upon 
the clandestine production of a wive armaments once the process of 
1 will be rdiEtly arried out mrl r3at there are no loopholes which will permit ! 
ml and aomplcte d-tyw beyn. Our munag does not intcnEi ' 
take an ne-at hlawatBn. .;'Nar do we expect others to taLE us at oar 
word. & $avtet Unicm b r firm advacate of r a i a  maad oret diurma- , 
ment." ENDC/PVZ# 15 Mar. 1962, p. 11. 1 
I 
10 ! 
to dominate the reality that their general assertions do not 
lead to adequate agreements on the esential, if less dramatic, 
detailsbl6 It is hard to escape the conclusion that the Soviet 
Union, for at least much of the tirne, seems to have been 
interested more in employing the negotiations as a means of 
wakening the military and political position of the West 
than as a route to a viable disarmament system. James J. 
Wadsworth has accused the Soviet Union of employing arms 
control negotiations as "part of a grand strategy aimed at the 
eventual total defeat of &e other side."" 
Thus, central though the inspection question may be, it 
i s  misleading to view it as an issue separable from the larger 
context of agreeinent or disagreement in the disarmament 
negotiations. 
Inspection is a prickly question in another way. One of 
the chief difficulties of disarmament i s  that, if there is to 
be much progress* there will have to be substantial invasions 
of nationaI sovereignty and secrecy for purposes of inspection 
and verification. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the 
point succinctly when he told the Eighteen-Nation Confer- 
ence in Geneva: "Secrecy and disarmament are fundamen- 
tally incompatible."17 Yet it is precisely this kind of invasion 
of their sovereignty that Soviet negotiators have, from the 
outset, sought to prevent. Soviet strategic capabilities depend 
far more on secrecy than do those of the Western countries. - 
Moreover, the walls of secrecy that have been erected in Corn- ' 
munist countria are essential to the existing governmental - 
systems of the Communist world. T o  the Soviet Union, then. 
Western insistence that international control agencies must 
~ ~ W a d k o r t h ,  op. dt., . 41. See also Hemy Udnger*s analysis of the 
~ r d ~  at negotiatimg rig a -itltionopy Note. in ihe eontart tge tat 
ban issue, in "Nudear Testing and the P r o b b  of Peace," F m i p  AifM'rs, 
Vol. 37, No. 1 October 1958). Another, earlier Analysis of Soviet negotiating 
tactics in this held is FWCP; ~ a b o r n ~ ~ ~ ,  "N tiating on ~ t o m i c  ~ncrgg, 
1946-1947; in l l l y m d  oslnt and Jo7ph llobnam, odr. Negotiating 
with the Russia= Baton: World Ptrrae oaurdadan* 1S1). 
17ENDcpv.Io, 6 m. 19e p. 9. 
pmetqaq tpw walk af m c y  K ~ W  e f f ~  unda- 
mine the ,Communist system' itself. The achievm~ns; of r 
'disumed world, with i& concornitapt .full-blown symm qf ip- 
termtional inspection and control, would mqt prohhlg; . 
#rastically the conditions of governmew @'the Communbt 
world.18 The Soviet Union is thus asked, Eor the sab;Fed dis- 
armament, to acquiesce in the trans@vxda~;~ of its c m ~ ~  
bystem; it should therefore not be surprising tbat the .SO* 
$Union does not hasten to reach agreement on ~ p e c t b ~  
nts. Yet, it is difficult to disagree w$rh Seaetay 
open world is an essential condition ,of, t$p.c, ,lrjnd 
ament both the USSR and the Wait- powers 
ant This dilemma, more than any other, supports 
ion of those who believe that inspection is the 
key issue in disarmament. It also supports the belief of those 
skeptics who doubt that major progress toward disarmament 
t ' 
will be easily or soon attained. 
;"'# Secrecy i s  not a problem confined to the Communist states. 
,K ,?& 
. , 
7 :  ere are other totalitarian societies for which access for the 
. :. urpose of inspection would be no less disquieting. It is by 
.k o means certain that even an "open society" like the United 
lStates could easily accept inspection that might compromise 
$ndustrial and commercial secrets. The effort in recent yeam 
o obtain international acceptance of the safeguards stan& 
< t r  ds of the International Atomic Energy Agency suggest$ 
$*at other nations, too, are reluctant to permit incursions oh 
Yheir sovereignty. 
How can the need for inspeaion arrangemmts adequate 
to generate confidence be reconciled with the reluctance of 
the Communist nations, perhaps others as well, to permit 
intrusions into their domestic systems? And further, how can 
the ultimate requirement for an open workl be reconciled 
, with dosed governmental systems? If disamameat depends 
b n  resolving the absolute opposition of ultimately conflicting 
a plecessities, there can be no disarmament. 
18See Hdq Bull: "IR the Soviet Union, such inspectors could scarcev 
fulfill their functions without undcrminin the whole character of Soviet 
mdety.'' Thc Control of thc Arms Roac (EBm Yo& Pr-, 1964, p. 101. 
EV& the Sodkt Ohion has consistently recognized that 
£ar:rding w e n t  measurer inescapably imply far- 
reaching inspectiop ;'@d' control aimagements. This means 
that, if the end df ihe diPhmament road is to be reached, 
there must be xkvcdutfb* prerequisite changek-changes 
tbat substitute the will io cooperate for today's pattern of 
international d c t  and produce in the Communist world 
and elsewhere the condidom that make full inspection either 
acceptable or no longer necessary. No one can predict that 
such revolutionary changes will take place. The disarmament 
problem is thus m identify and undertake those initial meas- 
ura that will start the world on the disarmament path, 
provide adequate grounds for confidence on the part of 
suspicious governments, and avoid confrontation of those 
ultimate bus that cpnnot bt solved under today's condi- 
tions. In this wag the paglege of time and the developing 
aperience of arms limitatiow might lead to the necessary 
transformations. 
This is no ordinpry challenge. Well developed inspection 
arrangements, both intensive and extensive, that might p m  
vide the requisite confidence cannot, in all probability, be 
negotiated in the near future. Thw the key to progress in 
reducing a m  may well be the ability of goverriments to 
devise, a d  their willingness to accept, inspection systems 
with a high tolerance of emor. One way to etate the irsue k 
to ask whether governments will m should awpt  a large 
meah net, daigaed to catch only large violations that wou1d 
ovaurn strat* bdma and endanger peace and national 
-Ti:ty; or whether a fimr net, to catch d l  or almost all 
breakdowns of perkmunee, is essemtial.xD The limitation of 
arrnamena poses the sharp issue whether maximum inspec- 
tion -ngenrents are netded bl. whether minimum arrange- 
n~ena can be accepted. Addresing this crucial question 
=quires examination of the functions, limits, and methods 
of iaqqxtion. W e  ttae h & n  of the d p * i s  
gminder 9£ thir manwpt will rest on the 
as they &act the great h e r s *  espid1y 
and the. Unit& the analysis win be in considerabIe 
meamre ap.pWle;to other countries ae Gel. 
b L 
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The Functions and Setting of Inspecfion 
IN THE NARROWEST SENSE, the purpose of inspection is to 
supply information about the observance of obligatiom to 
regulate armaments. More precisely, since governments or- 
dinarily obtain a great deal of information through various 
open and clandesthe &wfwls, inspection serves to supple 
ment the infomation frum*these sources and to enhance &e 
reliability of what may already be known. Information de- 
rived through inspection also 'provides public evidence about 
performance of obligations under systems to regulate a m .  
To leave the matter here, however, i s  to leave unanswered 
all the significant questions about the role of inspection iq 
the complex process of reducing thg threat of national arma- 
ments in ways that do not i e i r  national security, or in- 
crease the risk of war. These questions lead to an exploration 
of the interplay between what is being regulated (conven- 
tiopal forces, nuclear weapons, delivery systems, .military 
dispositions) , the strategic environment that results from the 
regulation (relative stability or relative instability) , and the 
measures available t~ s ~ m  that a c  victims of vialatiolo 
(reciprocal vialation, other national military or political 
responses, abrogation of agreement, community WC- 
tions. or enfacement masures). 
Before -mining these facets :of the problem, hawever, 
some preliminary observations are in order. First, inspection 
arrangements are predicated on the assumption that agree- 
ment on an arms limitation does not necessarily substitute 
harmony and mutual tmst for the existing pattern of inter- 
national relatiomhiw. It is m m e d  that even hostile nations 
i 
can bnd common intaan in redudng the rirlrs and the 
brtrde- of unbricJUed arrrm mce. fmpection, in the ward9 of I 
one SCboIar, + #"the vehicle for the hope that some simple ': 
baidgccpnbefonrrd the abyss of diyrwt inherent in' ) 
the &ntempai-y international power ~tdiggle."~ A British ' 
schoIar@ ~ d l e y  Bull, har pointed to the tendency to regard : 
a% and control as important S; 
only on th6 m m  .of reduc- ? 
tioa . He rightly suggests that 
rih&&kl ~ a h r e 4 i 2 &  'be functibne, &miapping'bot not , 
synonymous: (1) to help dettr 'dolaiions; (2) TO 'detect d o h  
tibmwthdt M&d,!amd (3) to provide kmmmnee that 
mznmigmeab & bttngffil~~ed. I 
I . * . + ,  
. .  . I ; ,  , f ;  " . '  
' k ? ~ o $ q t . ~ .  ~org, ~ r ,  Y 'TI ;tiW Im &* ction: Fmm Propals to Re#- 
tatldsb' ~ ~ ~ o m u t ~ ~ t  Orgdnrza on, Vol. No. 4 (Autumn p. 4W. 
S4 Bull, '%wb 'Ktadyl osE Ams 43mtro1," in S t d i e .  in D i s d m ~ t  a d  
clJrms,Cpp I Add hi B p  370.R ,GLQndov: Wtutc for Strategic Studbt), 
,. 1na.BfmltO.j' 
ird function is remumce: 
adstmce of violatib and proving 
tiolu i s  a mbtk but irnp6n;uit one. 
corwiderable tmipaa'ti6n. !io*tv&, 
- i r t '  
=The #O~LCOT rutcmcat of tbic mblan h: Fzed C. W, "Ahn R e d  
-What?'* Pordgn Agoirr, VoL 38. 80. 2 ( J r n u q  1961). pp. 2Q8-W. 
tberebfe, has a sta : 113 satisfying the otner parties that it 
io ~ y i n g  out its obligations. And since demonstrating 
compliance is an act in which each party should be more 
expert than any outside agency can hope to &, an inspectias 
system should allow. for opportunities f@r the parties to 
provide evidence of coraplhce so that all the burden a£ 
proving violatian is not placed on the system. 
The impormm of infowltion to show that the system is 
operating-as it should is evident. Once an inspection system 
bas been set up, its continued smooth performance is pre- 
s ~ l m d  to be an essential. condition of national confidence 
that there is no violation of the obligations being supervised 
and ;that future violations will be discovered. Even if there is 
no direat evidence of violation. the interruption of important 
flaws of infarmation will create doubt as 6 whether the par- 
t i e  arc living up to their  obligation^.^ 
4 1  three of these functions may be necessary to the snc- 
ceshl working of any arrangement to regulate arm. Clearly, 
the second--detection of violations-becomes most relevant 
to M arrahgement that is not working successfully. Neverthe- 
less, for the second function to be performed well will ordi- 
narily require that the inspection system have the capacity to 
perform well the other two functions. The assumption seems 
justified that variables other than the differences among these ' 
three functions will in most cases determine the nature and 1 
the severity of the demands made on inspection systemsl 4 4 I 
What are those variables? They are the three alluded to 
earlier:' (1) what is being regulated; (2) the resulting stra- 1 
tegk enviqopment; and (3) measures in response to violations., '1 1 
~Tcftnan dl Hadperin identified somewhat differently what they tamed 1 
"orignahronr" h r  UUJNX~~GBEX I) to insure detection of non-complipaa; 2) 
to deter evasion; or ) to warantee security. This scheme omits the "reas- p 
suransew kactolr lrrd takcd rather a minimum view of what should be 
demanded of inspection. See Donald G. Brennan and Morton H. Halperin, ! 
"Policy Considera'tions of a Nuclear-Test Ban," in Bretman, q. M't, pp. ? 
234-266. 
a But see Lincoln P. Bloomfield's su stion that reassurance may make 
severe demands of inspection in T h e  PoKcs of A m  C a t r o l :  Troikn, Veto, : 
and International Znsti p. Stud Memorandum ; 
No. 3 (Washingtan: Ins On lhl), pp. 1811. , 
See p. 15. 
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To inspect the elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles 
involves different techniques and carries a heavier freight 
of consequence than to inspect an agreement to limit con- 
ventional forces to aisting levels. 
The kinds of arms regulations that might call for inspec- 
tion are almost infinitely various. Some measures would 
involve no disarmament at all-for example, agreements to 
stabilize budgets, personnel, or weapons at existing levels, or 
to refrain from orbiting weapons of mass destruction in out- 
space, or to cease testing nudear weapons, or to refrain from 
certain types of research. The agreement not to militarize 
Antarctica was such a regulation. Agreements regarding the 
deployment of military farces would fall into this category, 
as would arrangemena to safeguard against surprise attack 
by providing for the exchange of information or for station- 
ing of moniton or control posts at strategic installations. 
Another type of anns arrangement might provide for the 
reduction, but not dimination, of existing armaments or 
categoria of amzunents by fixed amounts or n u m m  by 
mias or percentages, by destructive capabilities, or to fixed 
levelS. The latest United States p ropod  for general and 
complete dismtnament advocate this approach, mvering all 
weapons and particular types." Still another type would call 
far the immediate complete elimination of all weapons or 
forces of certain k i d ,  a of all kinds. All the types of u- 
panpc~l2rs mentimed rn examples, and many more, have 
aaual17 figured in pmpumls advanced at one time or another 
in the postwar search for acceptable measures of disarmament. 
Inspection metho& muat be rap*  to the needs posed 
by the objects being contfolled; the range of possible tech- 
niques i s  great. Technologid monitoring, employing iastru- 
mentation such a seismmphs and radar, is one technique. 
It Is relevant to such Ijrnitations as a nuclear test ban and 
regulation of space vehicles. Aerial and space surveillance, 
wing advanced photographic techn01ogy, can be useful in 
uni&  ati ions Dor DC/POS, 5 Jlule 1962 (ENDC/d6.18 Apa. IOgq . 
&eckiw for &dnpSe; on elimination or geographic restrk- 
tion d missile emplacements and prohibition of production 
of designated major weapons sys tern. 
In many ,ways human obsemdon is the best' means of 
inspection. On-the-spot inspection can the for& of per- 
w e n t  control posts ra regular or ad hoc inspection visits. 
It is pertinent, either as a pripary or supporting inspection 
means, to almost all  limitations. R~ecor& examination, either 
of ficcal recar& or of production and material controlr. .h 
relevaat to productba restraints and budgetary limits, among: 
others. Persoad records inspectian may also be relevant: to 
limitations on military manpower or-by keeping tabs on 
individuak with key h c t i ~ a s  and special sk i lkon  weap 
o m  research, devt$opment. and production. Socalled ''pp 
chol~@cal" op b a n  inspection is designed to elicit infix- 
mation frcm the popul+tibs of the country being inspected 
and is relevant to all types of restraintsa= 
It is not possible, by pawing examples of kinds of 
limitations and of inspection techniqw or even by e~anrin-  
ing complete Invenmrics of both, toreach any $wimu f&e 
qan.cPusiom as to which categories pose gsreata diflicultierr of 
inspection or pr.-t greater ridu to the participanu. These 
b, mr8bple pmgrasion of diflEiculty or significance from 
rwai.nu that do 'not actually reducs arms9 through tihose 
taat .call fw partial red~ctbm, to total reductions. It may be 
more difkuit tedanieally aad - poditicidly. for example, to 
inspecty nn agreement, not to orbit vehicles of mam decltruct 
tion in space than an agemeat EJ elkinate all mval -Is 
~7 T6e reader interestei in fuller exammation of thh of edrrin$ ud 
antidpared b m t i e a o f ~ p c e t i ~ f k ~ t e n r s i s ~ e c l  to rhe " bk 
bady of wcczt litounn on the subject. SeC the pioma m a ?  
mour Mehan, ed., Inspdction ~ Q Y  D-mnt (New York: Q1umbia W v .  press, 1958). b c  chapters by Sahn and Frischs U t e i n ,  stmi Pholpa 
~q ,David W. Frkh, A r m  Reduction: hogrum and Issues (New V w .  Twmw 
tieth &tuq Fund, 1961): du m by Wiesna. in Louis Henkin, ed., A- 
Con8ml: IMWS for the Public &ew Y& Prentie-Hall, 1961) ; chnptm by 
Wiemas FeM, anid Bohn, in Bnmnm, . cit.; Bernard T. Feld, et d., The 
Technical Problanu of Arms Control &w York Institute for Intemationd 
Order) ; chapteps by Ibhn, Melmsul, Gemmi, KarI Dcuech, and Fxhcllin , in 
~ v p n   right anti *orton Deutwh, d., P r m t i n g  World war 111 &m 
York: Simoa and Schuster, 1962). 
rn~gulagrertnordathrntd~allber.'krs& 
dapite the fact that the fmma involves ho PaDal dislfirP 
While th& !at= doei, violation of the brtmr mikht 
,, 
p e  @&t& rklo tb n0aiviol.d than m-t *iahtion ef ' I ,  
In this matrix the difficulty of inspection refers only to the 
technical problems. 
Obviously, the place to look for worbble first measures 
is not in the upper right-hand corner. Measures in the lower 
left-hand corner may be worthwhile, particularly if they have 
the potential of generating mutual confidence. But they are 
unlikely to be important enough or to pose sufficiently diffi- 
cult tests for the inspection machinery to generate much 
movement toward larger, more important measures of arms 
reduction. 
This matrix may be more useful in suggesting places not 
to begin than in giving positive guidance. While it is appar- 
ent that one should be searching for measures that lie in 
the area demarcated by the broken line, the broad descrip 
tions of the matrix do not give enough qualitative definition 
to be very helpful in pinpointing what is usefully achievable. 
Each measure in the appropriate area of the matrix needs 
to be individually examined to assess what risks it poses and 
what difficulties of inspection it presents. Particular care 
must be taken to avoid assessments that are too static. Both 
the elements of risk and difficulty of inspection can change 
rapidly. 
The explosive growth of technology and the impact of major 
investments in research may very speedily alter the problem 
of inspection. This applies to the development of weapons, 
to the techniques of evasion, and to the capabilities of inspec- 
tion apparatus. Missiles, for instance, were not vulnerable to 
previously existing capabilities for detecting approaching 
aircraft. Nuclear submarines are invulnerable to old tech- 
niques for submarine detection. Evasion techniques are a 
constant subject of military concern because the successful 
conduct of war requires an ability to deceive the enemy and 
evade his efforts to.identify and intercept your forces. The 
layman obviously can know few of the details. Yet, he can 
be sure that efforts are constantly being made to improve 
the capacities of aircraft, missiles, submarines, and other m e  
bile instruments of war to evade detection. Camouflage to 
conceal ground installations from enemy aerial surveillance 
nd to hide infantrymen from snipers is a matter of contin- 
uing interest to military services. Not all military metho& 
of evasion are relevant to inspection of arms control agree- 
ments, but, obviously, many are. On the other side of the 
scale are efforts to improve detection techniques. The Bal- 
listic Missiles Early Warning System (BMEWS) was a re- 
e to the problem of detecting approaching missiles. 
oject Vela was an attempt to improve techniques for de- 
ting nuclear tests. It also performed another function-to 
creaseunderstanding of the problem without reference to 
vancing technology. To understand more, however, does 
not necessarily make inspection easier; increased understand- 
ing after the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958 made 
inspection of the proposed nuclear test ban appear more 
difficult. No over-all prediction, O ~ V ~ O U S ~ ~ ,  can be made as 
to whether inspection is likely, in general, to become easier 
or more difficult. All that is certain is that the problem will 
It is often stated, but deserves reiteration here, that no 
inspection arrangement can be foolproof, although the fact 
that certainty cannot be achieved is dearly no reason to 
eschew efforts to control arms. The problem is to devise 
inspection systems that reduce the probabilities of successful 
evasion to tolerable levels. Some calculations of probability 
can be worked out mathematically or statistically; others 
represent no more than informed guesses. Since the attempts 
at statistical precision always rest on postulated assumptions 
as to the conditions under which inspection will go forward 
-some of them, to be sure, descriptive of existing or predict- 
able reality, but others speculating about unpredictable de- 
velopments-they too rest ultimately on the best guesses of 
the analysts. 
Furthermore, it must be recognized that in some cases no 
inspection arrangements can even reduce the uncertainties 
to acceptable levels. What is "acceptable," of course, is not 
an absolute question. It depends on political circumstances, 
the general climate of confidence, the relationship of the 
particular measures to other existing or contemplated arms 

Amorher mponse is to devise arms limitations that d 
facing this dilemma. The elimination of nuclear stockpile& 
is obviously now beyond the realm of achievement, sMf tb 
postpone the rkks attendant upon making the attempt is not 
ably prudent; it is probably a necessary condition of progress. 
For this type of risk to become acceptable, many changes will. 
have to have occurred in the v e n t  environment--amelia 
ration of political conflict and a confidence-inspiring history 
of successful arms limitation are among the necessary ingrc 
dients. Changes of this order will require the passage of con- 
siderable time, and, if they are possible at all, will be achieved 
only by postponing high-risk measures until late stages of the 
progression t m r d  general and complete disarxiament 
-emen@ liu in' the rimtiom that obtain after the ar- 
~rangtmmts b?v;e4xeh implemented. Many ingredients arc 
inv01werd;a21 uf &em dif.Iiieult to merw with confidence. There 
is the fw&& o~33I;lhion that governments are asked, ba 
doFe rtqgre'ernents uc &teed into, to anticipate how they will 
upmate ia a future (hat a n  be at best but perceived. 
T h e ~ ~ t j o r i 9  of the paties are imponant. Is it, to state 
tlae mat& in tenns, their purpose to explorit a p -  
namt to d u c e  the ~ish of war, cut down armaments costs, 
i n a e a ~  , m a 1  coaMepce, stabilize international r e l a b  
<&ips, aMl tmidd the p~tlirita far more bqeaching ~mcac 
met of c i & a m a ~ 3 ' Q r b  a&aMwise, is an arms zagrmat. 
& A m  Jams Wadsw~rth's t e m ~  already quoted in 
a di@er&t &at= 'f* of a :gtand strategy aimed at the 
eventmf totd defeat. of"& d ~ e r  +side"? Will sane. or a11 of 
tbe pvties reek M, t d ~ e  gdhta*  of the unavoi&bik lacunae 
m obacuritirs m igrketncntd in mder to gain hn2ages  aver 
the other participants? Or will t b ~  k e p t  restraints desi@d 
tr, buiM m&de'~:e d stability? What is the political set- 
tibag3 k thtre important, unresolved issues? What are the 
p j d ~ ~ ~ d  cdndtti- :in which the agr'eemimts opaaee? 
Doer one party or do all believe that arms reductions a d  the 
envimnment that r a u h  from them will hasten .the achieve 
ment of national goah? L &ere mutual suspicion leading to 
friction and constant. p a w e  agzimt the'apparatus of the 
system? Or is there belief that the agreements mark a depart- 
ure with a better future in store? What are the amsequences 
of fnuaatMn of thOcK h op? One way to summatbe ruch 
qugstionr ir to a& whether ,the parties believe the agreements 
will lead to o condition of p e t e r  or lesser security. And in 
this amemmat the ten-1 consideration is the ~trategic rela- 
do~lstrips thPt will result from the agreements. 
To be@ with, $ovemmentc hevitably view most of the 
quesaiom r a i d  abme pess~s : i d ly ,  or at least cowxva- 
tively; they are unable to entrust the future of the nations 
for which they have responsibility to agreements based on 
ex''tations that mutual confidence, good feeling, and re- 
liable perf-ce of obligatioIis will prevail. Agreements 
will have obscurities or lacunae and it is only prudent to . 
amune that responsible authorities will tesponsibly seeL to 
convert them to national advantage or, at the very least, to 
avoid national disadvantage, which wsually leads to the same 
result To take just one hypothetical but hirly obvious 
example, can it be assumed that defense ministries will not 
seek t~ build bigger, faster, newer weapons of a given cato 
gory when an agreement has been reached to limit the 
number permitted? Nor are such efforts mxwarily an evi- 
deace of hostility toward the other parties to the agreement. 
Ddcnre minirmos behaw the q e  way when the restraw 
are imposed by sister k c e  miniraies or by gooemmeat 
com~I1ers .  It has to be taken for granted-at least in the 
car17 stages of the dimmarnent process-that, in shaping 
their military capabilities, pwticipants in a- control ar- , 
rangapea~ will try to hhion the most effective defensa 
withintthe ratmints established, even if they do not try to 
bend, evade, or break those restraints. 
Mmmvet, as has already been made clear, there is no 
&.son to agume that mutual confidence will prevail at &e 
moment of decision on an awr agreemeat. Politid temsim 
prat d the-*-hi ipt the very m f3tenU parrkr 
are asked to pihh confidence ia a dismmimcnt qgt&anfs3t 
In 1862, Brrlin.ul.us# viami aQd icla=rzb. am the i n d a m  
ips. These m d a  raum, ta 
heir succemms will aaot am&hue 
Th* ff mutual confidence cmfioa k anticipated, it? 
sot be surprising if goirements insist that they ha*t-&e 
b e s  ior oelf-mnfidence-the ability .to support! national W 
teests wit&, the resources remaining to them after thh p m  
takes effect. Since this ability is not 
enon, but involves B! relationship ta 
ats ptinciple, cument i$MWwthi 
njmc~$m that dikhhinriht &shxld 
rmC, sri$e ,& the imphcnta"t&m td 
die ' q k t y  &la 'e te  at p p  of atares ghin mBiW 
ad&atq&,' 4 bar thntq&iQ 4 a i d  bt e ~ ~ r t i a  i&p%B]t 
, fbr dl.'" Ftdm rlic 'khtemlmt :of *is ' to 'ie' sit& 
Elctoq NfilIment, how&&# 'l&g Pnld imm mtd, d 
ail the n ~ t i a t i o *  an d m a m e n t  b r ~ c  &pay. .dembn- 
*&d. "I%& id ' 
~imd thew!. 48 c e  
is #%k. Bat 
th, the d 
rhmld take places Ib thr: 
hikt nage. I 1  
'*'we '~nited ~ b t e s ,  ih its 18 April '1962 proposals, has 
advocated a 30 per ant  acrors-the-board cut in b t h  saraeSr;c 
delivery systems and other weapons in the first stagr. T b e  
United States contends that a p e m m t a g e  reductionsB is the 
ma& equitable way to cope with the problem (since the par- 
tia will begin reductiom froln merent levelr of capacity awl 
with different strategic rtqwirements)- in U t  it will preserve 
existing =ins of farce at lower uans levels. Moreover, the 
, amoa4he-bard a p p o d ,  involving cuts both in nuciear and 
conventional capbi&ria, :& deigned to even out whatever 
d iudvan~a  my p g ~ y  ~ y ,  mffer as a result of reductions 
in OW sphere. Ia m~ .*& United S&S would be 
 to give up >aIho]kuw nudear strength on thc 
asrwq&ion t h ; ~  itiwo& .begio with an advantage over the 
Soviet!Uoioa in tbjr spbqse; at the same time, the Soviet 
U t n i ~ ~  Q W  give up more wnyentional weapoos in a b  
I* -- becatwq of t.hg leqxctna:tion that it would have a 
laa+in. tht.,~pkme at the of thc redkction process. 
&+@,rfw~dd r a i n  its lead in the sphere in which it war 
~qkmw at the -t. This brief sketch barely begins 
to hint at thp c&tplexity of the United states plan, which 
pbo px~ppses mquura in other spheres, among them t e w  
qs)a of production of nuclear weapdns matmiah and reduc- 
tion <of ~teckpileq,* measures against surprise attack, and 
first-stage reduction of military personqel to 2.1 million ea& 
f& USSR and, the United Stat=? . 
.,2LBtt.le of this plan has met with Soviet favor. The USSR 
Boc ptopwgl, instead* a calling in the k t  s m e  
@ .compke .elbination of all means of duclear delivery;Y 
dkaumeling .of. &?reign military baser and withdrawal of for- 
e*. from dien temx-yr Feduction of armed forca 
% fixed. 1em4 (1,900,000 each), reduction of conventiq.d 
amamentl by SO per cent, and of armaments production and 
I mili~ry , . :apnditures "propprti~nately" to the other reduo 
the UN bd, 
d strictly limited 
and anti-airm& 
dssdks  in ehc 'pumbm-air' aefqp~p, to be retained by thc Union of 8ovh 
Sadalbt R ~ u b W '  wd the United States of America, exclusively in the$ 
mp terriari, mid & e . d  d ih second stage." Uaitcd Nui- DCJG A/Q 
n p. 8- I 
tions. The Soviet proposals provide, with respect to each 
measure of reduction, that inspectors of the proposed Inter- 
- - 
national Disarmament organization are to "verify imple- 
mentation" of the specified measures. 
- 
For the purpose of this paper, the key aspect of the United 
States plan may be that the United States envisages a meas- 
ured pace toward complete disarmament. Although a 30 per 
cent cut in United States nuclear delivery capability and 
conve~tional armaments is a major slice, 70 per cent would 
remain at the end of the three-year first stage. Moreover, 
even the 30 per cent reduction would take place in annual 
bites of 10 per cent each. In any one of the three years, each 
country would risk a disadvantage of less than 10 per cent 
if the other should fail to fulfill its obligations. That risk 
should be tolerable to both sides. The United States plan 
means that the government believes that United States secu- 
rity would not be dangerously threatened by a breakdown of 
the agreement at any point during the three-year progression 
to the second stage. The proposals, by and large, seem de- 
signed to create a relatively stable first-stage situation-and 
one relatively invulnerable to levels of violation likely to 
rupture the agreement. 
some of the specific measures proposed could be inspected 
relatively easily if the problem is simply to provide assurance 
that proportional reductions on the -basis of declakd levels 
actually occur. For example, the destruction of nuclear de- 
livery vehicles could take plade in central locations and be 
observed by the inspectors. The  same applies to conventional 
armaments.   ow ever, to ensure that production of nuclear 
weapons material has ended obviously requires quite an 
extensive and intensive inspection operation, because nuclear 
facilities would have to be inspected to make certain that 
sudiproduction has been stopped and that it stays stopped. 
The same is true of the conversion of nuclear materials to 
peaceful uses. Reduction of conventional forces to fixed levels 
involves more than counting the force reductions; it clearly, 
in its own terms, so to speak, requires counting the remain- 
ing forces to make sure they do not exceed the limit. And a 
2 1  
second thought about the seemingly slrnple r msures of 
ins~ection reveals the corn~lexitv beneath the surface. If 
A I I 
reductions of nuclear and conventional weapons are to take 
place by percentage, do not the over-all totals, on which the 
percentage reductions are to be based, need to be reliably 
confirmed to ensure that the parties make true declarations 
of the levels from which the reduction begins? . 4 I 
The elements of a perplexing dilemma are thus cl&rly 
delineated. The relatively minor risks that would be involved 
in the United States first-stage proposals suggest the possibil 
ity of limiting the extent and penetration of the inspection 
arrangements to ease the difficulties governments would face 
in accepting them. More intensive inspection would be post- 
poned until later stages when the extent of the reductions 
would be more significant. Smaller violations would then 
yield greater "payofEs" than would result from violations of 
first-stage limitations. Under this approach, first-stage inspec 
tion measures would be limited to those needed to ensurc 
that major violations, that might threaten security and 
stability, would not go undetected. It should be recognized 
that the latter is a "minimal" approach, based on only one of 
the relevant criteria. There is no doubt that, if the sole 
standard by which inspection arrangements are to be evalu. 
ated were the existence of relatively certain guarantees againsl 
de-stabilizing violations, the task would be much eased. Dis. 
armament, however, will be an intensely political process in 
which the reassurance functions will have high significance 
for both international and domestic audiences-the United 
States Congress being but one. Some reassurance might be 
provided by the comparison between information supplied 
under negotiated inspection arrangements and other infor- 
mation that would presumably continue to flow outside the 
more formal inspection channelsd2 High confidence in the 
82 The Soviet Union's uncertainty as to how much is furown of its military 
a&rs might place it under some extra pressure to fulfill its obligations 
under arms agreements. If we have fairly high confidence in information 
available outside the inspection apparatus, Soviet behavior would be a good 
indicator of intentions. However, there is bound to be a margin of doubt as 
to the reliability of such information in the absence of a hl ly  elaborated 
performance, of the oblig7tions under the United States plan, 
however# would neceaitate hirly artelwive irqedan ar- 
mgemetlts. 
On the whok, while it will surely be difficult to' reach 
agreement on high assurance inspection arrangements, it 
may also be dScwIt tb r e d  agreement without them. Morc 
over, topc~tpone the hues .until later stages is not to elimi- 
nate them. It is likely that some day declarations of exbting 
force levels would 4wrn- to be verified if arms reduction 
k to prx- to the low levels of high risk. At that time, also, 
very rigorous Wption controls would probably be essential 
with respect}to ~y sd$@ of limitations if even the minimal 
criterion i s  & be met. b e  would argue that the important 
thing is to get the ppoass started in the hope that with 
experience will comeco~&ace and with time, change that 
will either case the appliution of progressively more rigorous 
control8 or make t h c m ' a n n s q  because of the growth in 
international ~~nfi&mx. O;tEIm# however, would maintain 
that now is the time torget the disarmament process oE on 
the right footing. Since rigorous. inspection will some day be 
necessary, the argument goes, nations should &ow their com- 
mitment to the process by accepting immediately controls 
&at will allow the development of high confidence; thereby 
tewions and suspicion could be reduced sooner &d progress 
toward the long-term goal of general and complete disuma- 
ment could be aderatad. One reply to this wuld be that 
govments  may be appropriately' expected to clemunstrate 
their good will by accepting the degree of inspection neces- 
sary to make ihe proposed measures of disarmament feasible. 
and that to ask more of them is to seek to invade sovereignty 
gratuitously or, as i s  sometimes alleged, for disguised partisan 
Pu=pobeSo 
iarp~ctlan scheme aa8 we could rpever be ssm* for arpmple, that misleading 
information was not be* "fd" to the information sounxs. Brennan has 
stid: "me extent of our jiaibmmdon . . . kavca mu& to be d & d .  . . . The 
infomaation is tenibl inamphe, often misleading, anit mmctimer, &wn- 
wt taw  be d e s  OF fn~gxtiog in A ~ S  control/ Sum- Stutiy on 
A r m  C m $ ~ o l  196Yf: C o f k W  efa~r3 W n :  Anadcan A&y & Artl 
4 -, 1961), p. 249. , 
&g "to judge the we~ght Mat 8hould be 
strategic amidetatfi83ag1 in the auessIILcnt 
of inspection standards.-In other words, on the! one hand, 
d a c  is a risL that minimal i~pectian requirements will 
pose &cats U, nationnl m r i t y I  to iateirnth~ml hummy, 
and to peace. On tbr: a t h e l ~ .  these is the ria that 
rigorous inrpcaionr ctemm& wili pevent any agreement 
at dl, 
The United Stater.'po cads actually advocate a fairly 
delicate hqbmce W e e n  8 C att$&es of minimal and full 
impectid pEan atablissla the pl'inciptc ,of e f fdve  
ker3bicati&n, Sluding q a i + s u ~ c e  that *agreed levels of ama- 
mezits and bid fmtm were not dtceded,'  and that "actid& 
da lhited bt @&ibitdl by the Treaty were not being 
conduad chhdednely." Hwever, it g t k s  on to advocate 
thd€ *inspectha appaiatus should bc pqessively develop& 
in a ~ b c e  with the principle "that the extent of inspec- 
tion duriw any step or stage would be related to the amourit 
of elisarmmint being u n d d e n  and to the degree of risk 
to rhe P d e s  to the Treaty of possible violations." To mike 
the balance, the plan suggests the pib i l i ty  ,of a: d e m e  
for m p l e  inspktion by zone. Urider mch'a scheme, all 
arms 'reductions would be veriiDied btrt the extent of the 
crnitoty completely inspected to ens* tbav agned levels 
were not weeded would be ~ ~ t p  i n & d  untii, at 
thetad of th:$ thM rtage of the thited State plan, "whai 
all d ~ ~ C n t  meaguia had bcn completed, inspection 
would, b& *n orte@ed to irlI pvtl of the mitory of 
~ d d  '60 'Tray." 
It Ba *c* bcQ obwqd that iiwpection ir mart 
&lly viewed' in .h Won to thc rwpares avabbl 
vihicll ye Sne victims of violation by a m  
tbr parria De@me:&, af violation depends on the n 
of the responses available and on the likelihood, that th 
1 
b2 
will be employed. Jkisionx to react depend, in turn, on 
tho efficacy of isrspcction in, filling the prerequisite need f ~ r  
information. En m e y  Bull's words: "The ipfomtion 
gathered by int@igenci agencies or international inspector- 
ates . . . plays i part in a system of control only when it 
reacheti the hands of &use with the power and will to act 
upon it."= ,. ' 
, 1 
The dm,r~iqr,af tbc inspection tjystem's need for infor- 
mation dcpeo@,@n two interacting consideratiow. One is 
the severity of the violation and the consequent risks attach- 
ing to appmpt(? wmtameasures. Thcsekd is the nature 
of the s y e  d r m p w ,  whether it i s  a "self-help" systemz 
or an organkai in&mational instrument for  enfckcing the 
a n n s  limitazjiom. 
"Punkhrnmt'' is a h  neegardo as the purpose of measured 
taken in repom to viahtiun* Actdlys it ir probably the 
least important and least convincing of the reasom for such 
meaura. ,One hportqat reasonS it i s  obvious, is detqrence; 
t& assurance &at appr~priaw meamerr can be taken that 
will limit the advmtagc of nolation'is a means of reducing 
the temptation to .violate. Another important reason is to 
q b l c  govemeatl  to rqtify the imbalances, neutralize the 
threats, and repair the gaps that 'violations. may create, A 
high degree of assurance that such meaures will be available 
in the event of ,vialation seems an ecsential condition of b y  
I .  important ,urns agjreement coming into effect. * .  - ' 
In genmls minor v&ti- that.do not threaten 
the parties, to m y  @eatt e x t e n ~ a u  for minor respo~wa. 
This i+s WQW. &@w cesipnaes in themselves mag involve 
great risk and we rhw unlikely to be undertaken lightly by 
governments. In arms control, as in other spheres, the prim 
up1e of condip pwm&t hppars to, apply* HoweverS 
ent mi= vEr[rMm might generate pseaures for m?- 
jar, perhaps hazardow, respamess less 'of strategic 
rislu posed by the &olitioar themselves than because the 
wcgrity of the @€aI.l is iIrlp-t, 
=xTrn tio& bh A- Comaol," oQ. dt., p. I&. 
xA&ilB"bfe' rapu& kpqge frdre ohg mfnaa ttl &may 
d o u r  in rough cmehtim with the natutc aE thc O Q & T ~ % & ~  
p d  by violadom. As lmg as 'nuclear capabiaitks continue 
to exist, it might be aid that available responses begiiP *t 
zero and appr6ach &&y. - Ir 
The appropriate respo& to violation at the lower end 
of the scale--pahaps the result of obscurity in the agrco 
ment, administrative mdi; or even limited efforts to probe 
the gmsibilw 'oE getting ' i i i q  irith minor e~icms-may, 
in some wes, 'br ta ~i' orC the violhtiun, at least in public, $" Cl%d&ne ~ p s  cob d &en be *Ikm to counter whatever 
m g e  tnay hatre ben done, perhaps supplemented by a 
~~~kss&k  to 'the' violatbz''ihat' hc has not gained an advan- 
tage.@ Negotiating compliance may also be approgriatkPu 
sam&n&=an tlia. h i s  of newly agreed understandings as 
emeht s ~ ~ a n s  and bow iu requiremenu may 
be' hlfi1led:rn 1 
Vioht.9m - sat threaten to de-stabilize military balance 
map d l  6Dr more extreme nepmes~ It should be mted: 
ineidddly, that the very £act that an aims agreemeht exis@ 
may infuse an* othawi~;ambiguous action with a connota- 
tion of extreme t h ~ e a t . ~  Risponses ta such violations include 
vi ton vidationtieither the' m e  m e m e  as the 
d~Iator's or some other meisme to retake balance or to 
pmvikte defense wins t  the con~lequt~es of the original 
. 
LD appmp&t&:doui~tern%~ure5 need vi01ate 
some -7 fall oa&t the agreement's wope 
donion of nuclear vehicles or intensify research and testing 
in the fieId d anti-missile defense. Denunciation of the 
agreement-or of all arms agreements-is another' avallabli 
recourse, although a fairly extreme one, since it implies the 
possibility of a nkewal af the arms race. Finally, military 
action, including haclear war, cannot be ruled out as a 
response to exaemiklp. pi"oqocative violations. 13eployoam&. 
of nuelear dclirery vehides in apparent violation of aa" 
agreement to redwethe risks of surprise attack, for examplep . 
would force other ~OFWZ-S -to consider seriously whetha o# 
not to launch a wpiivetnptivcm nuclear strike to forestali th# 
nuclear attack. sbehn2ng1y threat& by the violator. 
The kinds- of' ftiekbeai sketdied in the preceding para 
graph are designed tb ~edttce the "payoff' to a violator $".""' 
countering the military advaiteges his violation might othcr; 
wtie generate? 3%wt some of themealso involve con~equence~ 
to the over-all te-ktim! ofrelatiom amdng the parties; tensions 
might be heightked and the' risks of war increased. Th  ,.;*& 
same may bc s&id for *$pan&s that involve denial of d i p l a #  
matic, economic, or politid goals of the violator. Sanctions 
of this kind can be exm=ted..in the direct diplomatic, eeo- 
nomic, and political relations of the parties wiih each other. 
They can be exerted by the akion of permanent or 
ad hoc coditions or alliances; by efforts to mobilize a hue 
and a). of international public opinion, through the imtim 
tionaiized m g m e n t s  of the arms control ap&tiorn, 
or through the United Natioas, 
,The implictxtions of this range of posible respoTlSeiii for 
inspection ~eedk are not entirely apparent. It seems Jear 
that, before g p v ~ c n p  responding-to violations undertake 
measures that th-1xa ~ s r y  a heavy freight of risk or 
-
a ~t SILO~M be IIMEKI, 'hmnrrr, '&eke xnq be no way to redoe the 
"payoff' i q  some vioIsrthns. It would do the victims little good ts learn 
reliably &it one of &e' parties {had mcece&d in c1anWdnzly producfng 
arid deploying enough- nudear £om & a against mWks suffidentl 
efkct,ive to over rn the klanae of deterrent pow.  On this point rc PauI 
Y. Hammond. '%me. DMcultier of SeM-enbrcing Amu Agreement*" The 
j am1  of ' Cmflict RcsoJutio~~ V& VI, M. 2 (June 1962), p. 106. Maas- 
- mond d d s  with r possible e i e t  viokha of a dircapgement irrgniclncnt 
in Europe. 
potential disadvantage, they will need to have unambiguous 
evidence of violation; this implies a need for information 
. 
that is ample in quantity and high in reliability. However, \ 
the key element here is that the information available to I 
governments be persuasive that the violatkn has occurred, ( 
whetha the information comes through the established in- 5 1 
spection apparatus ot via the other channels through which , 
information customarily flows to governments. Whether or , 
not the inspection arrangements demonstrate the existence ? 
of a violation, a government convinced by its own evidence 
'\ 
that a serious violation has occurred will act in defense of 1 
its interests. Such information may not be as reliable an i 3 instrument of deterrence ur a high-quality inspection ar- 
rangement. However, the very £act that much ia unknown 
abwt the information-collecting capacities of individual 
, governments may make it more difficult to devise techniques 
of evasion that assure escape from detection. The limits of 
an int-ernational system, on the other hand, will be known . 
and may thus help a potential evader to calculate his chances 
of getting away with a viola t i~n.~~ 
With respect to very threatening violations, irispection 
arrangements seem to serve a reinforcing function. They fi 
in the gaps in government intelligence sources, provide 
means of checking the reliability of information tha 
wise available, and permit governments to avoid co 
ing revetations of their own information sources. Probably, ' 
inspection arrangements carnot be substituted for 14 
me'n tal i n  tell igence sources; governments will continue to 
To do 90 W t  reveal too much about their intelligence ' 
=On this polrrt, see Fred C. R I C ,  Altmaatfa A34yoaches to the Intat. 
national Orgfltnbaticm af Dimmaamnt (Santa Monica, Galif.: The RAND , 
C o ~ p o d a ,  Feb. 1Sa) . p. 9. 
MT. C. O'Sullivaa has explored some of the ways in which national in- 
fornation 9pems and intemathd inspections arrangemenu interact in 
" N u b  Tcst Ban, Detection Networks and National Decisions" (Lexington, 
,, Mass.: Itek Laboratories. PO Feb. 1961, revised 9 May 1961). (Hectograph.) 
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of basidly umramcled national  sovereignty from the 
.T-y of meaningful supraatic)nal authority,"41 The prc 
requisite for the latter is a degree of internatiwal c o ~ ~  
that will permit effective sanctbns to be applied by the law- 
. 
abiding against thme who violate the law, whoever, they 
may be. , 1 
Thusy the nudear test ban treaty i &t put f m m d  on 
18 .April 196 1 by .the United Kingdom and the United State 
outlined an daborate cpstam of iaternittional inspection, but 
did not provide .even foe cullactive. decisioms as to whethn 
vbkd6m have ucamx& mu& I- far collective action in 
r a p m e  .to violations have been identified. 
The h&age of the most reant United Stat= plan for 
@semi .nd cmpIete cibmnammt  it^ obscure on these points. 
But since, at the end of the pro* second stagey the United 
States ind the &iet union would retain. ST, per c a t  of their 
ariginkl nuclear systems and conve&ional weapomy the 
United Natiom Pace Force proposed by the United States 
wotlld have to be a strong one to be of military significance 
with respect to either of these great powas. If the intema- 
tional community were able to solve the problems o£ creat- 
ing, controlling, and using such a force, a degree of consensus 
would &st, which practically by Minition would diminate 
the problems of endorcement of arms agreements with which 
this paper is concerndAor Mduce them ab easily manageable 
proportiom. 
Therefwe, meaningful analysis of inspection arrangements 
bns to ztdmhe that they will work h relation to a "self-helIj" 
tptem. "if dobe regpdns&' to vioiations were made by 
alliances or 0 t h ~  continuing or tem'prary collective gr~up 
in@, selk-help wouid itih be involved, albeit by groups of 
like-minded sates. ' 
One important'coni=(luence of this state of affiirs i s  *tb 
in itti essentials, the Cnforcement of arms agreements is not 
dependent ' ~ n  the crystallization of international consensus. 
4X ~ a & n  P. ~ l d e l d ,  *A& B-1 and World ~ ~ c r a t , * @  World 
Politla, Vol. XN, NO. 4 (July 1962). p. 641, 
. 
38 
Such consensus may be important in various ways, such as 
adding dimensions of political risk to the other risks in- 
curred by a nation that violates an arms agreement. As has 
been suggested above, consensus may be more important in 
avoiding and rectifying minor transgressions than in dealing 
with the major issues. Essentially, however, the operation 
of worldwide arias control systems depends on the system' 
ability to satisfy a few great powers that their national inter- 
ests are being served by the web of obligations, institutions, 
and functions growing out of the desire to limit armaments. 
In establishing inspection arrangements and in operating 
them, nothing should be allowed to obscure the central 
principle that the primary audience for the information 
developed by inspection systems is that small circle of gov- 
ernments on whose continued cooperation the survival of 
major, arms conaol tiystenudepends. There are other audi- 
ences to be sure. Every effort should be made to meet the 
heeds of other governments and of the world public as well. 
But when, ar is inevitable, the two ordm of priority get 
inreach other's way, the first should prevail. The prim- 
purpose of international inspection arrangements !b to en- 
sure the availability of an adequate flow of information, - 
unambiguous as p i b l e ,  to a selected number of govern- 
ments which need to be mured that obligations u n d d e n  
under arms ape&tntc are being Eulfifled, that ,the appa- 
nitus of inspection is functioning as it should, and that the 
gcwanments will b o w  it, shoultl either no longer be tme. 
'OPkcyum, over the longer range, the unfolding possibility 
of collective enforcement would. significantly alter this eo&-t 
clusian. It might, -&a be aecarr~rg to ctmtemplate a m & c -  
men@ to employ inspection ru an- instrument of collective 
ddsion-rnakitag. - Fa! present purposes, however, it daes not 
wan necessary to venture onto that unexplored and distant 
terrain. 
I Some Problems of Inspection I 
xi.,&bi.~n:~ THIS CHAPTER WILL EXAMINE selected inspection problems 
that have already arisen in acute form in the negotiations, 
or which seem likely to be confronted in the future. They 
demonstrate how complex are the considerations that bear 
on choices between minimal and full inspection. r 
Detection and Identification 
The nuclear test ban negotiations have shed light on an 
issue that might increase in-importance if, as appears likely, 
advanced military capabilities should be dispersed more 
widely in the future. That issue is how, once a violation is 
suspected as a result of the working of the inspection arrange- : 
ments, the fact can be confirmed and responsibility assigned. 
In short, inspection in some cases may involve both detection 
and identification of violations. This problem arises particu- f: 
larly in cases where initial detection measures employ distant I 
technological, monitoring devices such as have been proposed 
with respect to nuclear tests and limitations on activities 
in space. 
With respect to the nuclear test b particular, Set- 
retary of State Rusk pointed out: 
Detection, however, is only half the story; in fact it is rather less 
than half. The primary concern is to know exactly what has been 
recorded or detected. For example, the signal received on a seis- 
mograph from an underground nuclear explosion looks like the 
signals received on a seismograph from many types of earthquakes. 
Signals which may come from a small nuclear detonation in the 
atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In each case, the over- 
whelnjing diffi&lty confronting any contr 
40 
a nuclear tat ban is haw tm M&emtiate m o g  w i o m  r e c ~ &  
ingr or detected signahd'han to tdl  which is r natural p b -  
man a d  whicb & ,a. nwbq e?plpionOa 
; J . !  , 
Identifiqtion appew nc3cessary to confirm that a detected 
event was really a - @ ~ k t $ q  Confirmation is important for 
two reasons. Ope ja,te' non-violating goiements to 
take appropriate ilcm. $'iapnse. The second is to avoid 
dirpute h m w  :&!. , advancing conflicting inte- 
pretationr of .ewi-he Burmrm representative at 
the Eighteen;I?J@&an ~ b q q q m e n t  Conference, James Bar- 
ringtan, made a gl& &atwent of the problem: 
After the most camW qmest consideration, it seems to us 
that the claim ,&vi~t, q i ~ n  that all nudear explqsi~ns 
can ,be yhp&& bg means of national detection 
systetm, and that 40 hp&&t@naT hntrol is therefore nect?ssaty, 
leaves one vital qp&lid u e f S b d  It is: What hap ns in the 
are d a dispute &to. h e  facts of a #a;rfiwlar eventr . . Age& 
all, hrwewr gaod they my be, the ktruments which record the 
evmu do not get up md rpenl. What they do is to record data 
whi& twined p x u n ~ 1 e 1  interpret. It is therefore not inconceiy- 
abIC that interpretations may differ. How would a differmce of 
rhir.lind be rwIv@' bnl& ,thae were in existence some impar- 
tial iaternrtional &en'tific body acceptable to all the nudear 
PBIW~Y& whaK wcdon would' be to settle such disputes, if 
necessary dm markin3 ruch en uiries a d  inspections as may be $ considered by it to he cscentinl 
, 
Thus, e&ctive on-site imixction i s  seen as an importint 
supplement to distant monitoring if there is to be assurance 
that underground puclek exptosions can be identified as 
such. Out of this b u e  rose the recent United states-'united 
Kingdom proposal for an agreement banning tests, without 
special inspection atrangements, in the atmosphere, in outer 
space, and under water, as an alternative to an inspected ban 
on all media. Earlier this kue inspired the dispute over the 
n u m b  of inspection visits to be permitted. Until the Soviet 
Union repudiated entirely the  heme on which the negotia- 
a ENDC/PV.$ 23 Mar. 1962, p. 18. 
a ~ c / P v . I § ,  2 Apr. i962, pp. g-7. ' ,$a?- %' i I D ~ T :  .' 
% ,  
tioas had been f m c d ,  one of'the key divjsive issues was 
Soviet insistence that. no more than three on-site inspections 
should be allowed each year. The Western powers insisted 
on a higher quota. At first they demanded a fixed number 
of 'twenty and then proposed an alternative formula provid- 
ing for a quota of twelve inspections or, up to a limit of 
twenty inspections, 20 per cent of "the number of un- 
derground events" above the threshold seismic magnitude 
roughly' equivalent to a 20-kiloton explosion.* For the past 
year the Soviet Union has refused to consider this compm 
inise. More recently, the Western powers have indicated a 
willingness, in the light of newly evaluated Project Vela 
data, to settle for fewer on-the-spot inspections. 
Unfortunately, there is not much ground for optimism in 
the publicly available evidence as to the effectiveness of on- 
site inspections as a means of identifying small underground 
detonations. For identification to take .place, several very 
difficult steps must be successfully negotiated? Aerial sur- 
veillance, employing various technical devices, must first 
narrow down the area in which the unidentified event is 
suspected to have occurred. Then, ground teams must try to 
locate the area more precisely, "hopefully within a circle 
of about 500 feet in diameter." This is an optimistic estimate 
of what can be achieved. Finally, deep drilling operations 
must be undertaken to attempt'to discover evidence of sub- 
surface "radioactive fission products as positive evidence of 
a nuclear detonation." Such drilling is costly. In hearings 
before the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy 
in 1960, i t ,  was estimated that it would cost $378,000 once 
the equipment was in place to achieve 100 per cent coverage 
(63 holes) in the search for an explosion of 1.7-kiloton yield 
at a depth (1,200 feet) too low to have left surface evidence 
MSee the mmments of Brennan and Halperin on the difficultp of evalu- 
ating the eflkctive difference between three and twenty on-site ~nspections, 
h Brennan, op. cit., p. 265. 
&The following technical infonngtion comes from US. Congress, Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy, Technical Aspects of Detection and Inspection 
Control3 of a Nuclear Weapons Test Ban: Summary Analysis of Hea~(ngs, 
Awl 19, 20, 21 and 22, I9610 (Washington: GPO, 1960) , pp. 13¶ 48-49. 
of the explosion. A comparable search for a 20-kiloton arplo 
sion would involve drilling a d l a  number of holes (10) 
far deeper (2,700 f a )  at an estimated cost of $835,000. It 
would cost $94,000 to drill for a 100-kiloton explosion (4 
holes, 4,700 feet). Another way to view the problem is in 
tenns of the probawty of discove&g the radioactive zone, 
within a predetermined 500-foot radius, with fixed numbers 
of drill hoh.  The results look like this: 
5 holes 16 A Q I ~  
Pmbbfiq ef 
These estimates, predicated on relatively hvomble terrain 
conditions, suggest that larger explosions * nlazivefy 
fewer d i h l t i e s  of identification than smaller o m ,  but 
that the latter ma). be  wry difficult indeed to identifj~ In 
denser groun& which lvoalg limit the explusion e h  mare, 
a larger number of holes would be necessary to x h ~ c  the 
samereenxh, . 
More recent emmimtion of the problem s u p &  thzt 
i~llpmvd dewtion tmhiquer and improved s a t q i e s  £m 
deploying demtion devices may reduce the number of un- 
identified undaground urploaions. While same riquirnnen~ 
feo. sn effective inspection system may thus be reduced, it 
does aot scem that these advances ;alter substalotially the 
basic considerations concerning identification requirements. 
The problem is limited, in any case, to q mall number of 
zones of high earthquake activity. Presumably, distant moni- 
toring has no diffihlty identifying the country in which 
such suspicious events occur. 
Dierent considerations may itpply to atmospheric. or outer 
spaoe explosions or a great many other activities that might 
be prohibited or limited by atms agreements. With w i t h  
dispersion of nuclear and missik capability, it may some day 
become important to be able to identify precisely both the 
.nature and the sburce of ekntr rhat appear to violate pro- 
hibitions on activities in the atrpqphere or space. If thc great 
p ~ w a  ~ determined to onfwa s d  prohibitiaor against 
other cta- enforcement &ould pose .no difficulty, 
padded a bash has been bid far obtaining reliable evidence 
to ideaffy violatiom whea thcy ocw. 
lmpdtm sf 2 P k w m  or 81 Arn~t~rneabt  
1 
Om contentious issue bas . k n  wh&er inspection should 
be limited ,to s u ~ i o n  of actual reductions of a r m  or 
whethar, ,in the -& (If the United States outline of p re  
visionr for a treaty on g e n d  and complete disarmaAent, 
"verifica- mngemec:nts" would be "necessary to ensure 
throughout the dknmme11t process that agreed levels of 
armmce~gtg~ md mad b e e s  were n ~ t  exceeded." The isme 
i s  m & m  &find as thr question of 'koontrl of disazaa- 
merit er over amaments." "Cbnmal over amax~ents" 5 the 
descdptim &vesl to the Unmtd, States propo~lr by Sovie& 
representative0 who cxcoriatc itim a L'leg-z&ed system of 
idtenmiod apionage."a 
The United States representative to the Eighteen-Nation 
Dkummsat Conhence, Arthur Dean, stated the principle 
&kt "it L the nature of the obligation that determines the 
type of controt which b 1 1 e c q . ' ' ~ 7  This is a wwfui rtandard 
lmauw it allow didmination between a r m  1iaait;;ttionar 
which do n- require imqmtion beyond what is neccsJary 
€6 ~~tmwve thrt a ~ e e d  atxiom have becn taken, and t;hw 
which q u h  mime dun , 
T k  b t  witqpq % a limited one comprising commit- 
&%& tb dm6y fixed number$ rn quantities of armaments, 
if sacb :fedticticin 'is imeversfb~~ An obligation* for example, 
to destroy a number of tanb or wanhips or aircraft clarly 
fits tsh cat-* ondc dest&yed, the weapons are gone. The 
ody requh~~tht for orurk~ite+ that the obligation has been 
fulfilled it the opportunity to obs&ve whether the wc~pom 
, have indeed k n  done may with. 
USutmwnt br So* Z"pmqwatia~e: Zorin. in BNDC ~k06,24 Apr. 196% 
p. PI. 8c+ rLo hu stataaenr in ENDC/PVSI. 16 Apr. I&, p. 31. 
a BNsepvs, 18 AP. me ip. 1% 
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Otha typer of,li,tni~l;ions~dnnlnd more Eu-reaching e- 
fication. When reduetiom we calculated as p r o p ~ r ~ n s  of 
forces existing at the oumt of the paamid eo-tion that 
obligations are be iq  fulfilled nquireb verification of tbe 
original force ,levels Q well as verification of the level of 
forces remaining. after the reduction. When f o e s  ire re- 
duced to fixedJ lcvek, confirmation &at obli8;ati~ons are being 
fulfilled requires verificktion that remaining f ~ r c q  do. not, 
in fan, exceed the qtablished levels. Both, these example, 
involve ueriiication not only of what bqs ,been eliminated 
but a h  of what: mnainr. It is difficult to underspad how 
one can reamwbly quarrel with thjlr assessment of ippec- 
tion requirements if what is sought i s  indeed, Ps Soviet 
officids have frequently reiterated, "the necessary g u b  
tees that the disarmament obligations that have been agreed 
upon will be strictly carried out."** Yet the USSR seems to 
deny this simple and unavoidable logic. 
The same considerations apply also to meaSures to reduce 
or eliminate specified aaivitied, such ar production of mate- 
rials of war. The only way to ensure that such obligations 
are being fulfilled is to verify; often that will involve iafpec- 
tian to make certain that activities which have been redud 
or eliminated are not ~ e p l d  by orhen begun clrmhael ' 
'It k thus not dicult to identify the limitatiom that imply 
a necessity to inspea remaining capabilities as well as t b a ~  
that have been eliminated; ongoing processes, as a class,. fit 
this C p w .  
t . . .  
f 
Ow of the charges Sovia reprpwntatives like to make 
ir that the United Staw p m a  its demands for inspection 
because it .is interested in information about Soviet strategic 
targets. Again and again the Soviet delegates to disarmament 
conferences and to the United Natians stress the theme that, 
to Mr. Zorin: 
I 
Secretary Rusk, in a very effettive and convincing speech 
to the Eighteen-Natio~ Disarmament Conference on 24 
March 1962, refuted the Soviet arguments that the United 
stat&-united Kingdom ihtpection proposals of April 1961 : 
were designed to make possible espionage against &e Soviet 
Union. He ~eemphasizkd that the Western plan had been sup 
, 
ported by the Soviet Union in its essentials until the USSR 
reversed its p i t ion ,  and he went on to analyze the contem- 
plated ins ection arrangements in some detaif. These. pr& 
vidd for L e d  control pose at sites approv&d by the USSR. , 
One-third of the technical personnel and dl of the auxiliary 
personnel for these posts would be Soviet citizens. On-site 
inspection teams would visit sites predetermined by seismo- 
graphic recordings, using Soviet transport, carrying specified 
equipment, and accompanied by Soviet observers. The in- 
spected areas, Mr. Rusk pointed out, could at most total , 
annually one part in 2,000 of the total Soviet area. Aerial 
sampling flights would employ Soviet aircraft and apws and 
have Soviet observers aboard.lsO 
L 
However, there can be no doubt that the purpose of in- . 
spection is to provide information, and inspection of some 
of these limitations would no doubt supply information of 
some strategic importance. Limitations on numbers of stra- 
tegic missiles, for example, would involve inspection of 
* launching sites to ensure that the total number of missiles 
deployed did not exceed the number permitted. Measures to 
reduce the risk of surprise attack would also require precise 
knowledge about strategic deployment. The range of meas- < 
4 ENDC/PV$G, 24 Apr. 1962, p. 28. 
50 ENDC/PV.8# 23 Mar. 1962, pp. 14-15. 

the effect may well h to diminish significantly the impr- 
tanm of seaecy as a rafeguvd against emq, attack . 
Furthermore, secrecy .may &,a diminishing aaret as main- 
taining it beam la -aMf 1- possible. The United States 
U-8 flights apparently col,tected a great deal of information 
abwt Soviet strategic capabilities and production f a d l i k  
A good many unidentified spice satellites have 'ken orbited 
by the Uniccd States and i g  likely that at least some of, 
than arc Sam@ satellites, able to perform m y  6ifl-t 
reconnaissance functim. It is fprtpnate, in tenns of the st* 
bility of mutual detmewe, bat  space atellites y y  be e r e  
useful in identifying fixed. installatio~ thereby prowag  
lonpterm or strategic intelligence, rather than t a c t i d  up-t* 
@-minute targeting information. lHowwr, they should be 
vety useful in providing, evidence of cumulative b n p  in 
the strategic &pitions of the counmes being rumeyed. 
Thus, it may be t . t  national, intelligence activities wi4 suc- 
ceed in eliminating or vastly reducing the value senecy naw 
hpl, although this trend may be limited by the growing reli; 
ancc on nudear .delivery systems such as the United States 
Polarb mbmarincs and Soviet missilelaunching submarines 
that achieve secrecy by qnobilityma . 
How valuable sacrecy i s  or what risk i s  w e d  by -e- 
menu ta inrpoct stxategic facilities depends very much oa 
what the w i a  already b o w  abut each other's military 
d i s p D s i t ~ ~  It is p i b l e ,  but not vesg likely, that,tlre USSR 
know$ ks abokt United SPta stfategic dispiti~ns thzn is 
cornonly bclievaf: it is po*cible. and perhaps mcwe likely, 
that the United St&$& already lrndws a grood &a1 a h t  those 
of the Soviet ~ n f ~ .  *Obvi~wIp, &ssmmt of those condid- 
erati-. har to take, iqto a .dnt%'  the over-all strategic bal- 
ances, the ,gen&l relatiodips kiwecn the parties, their in- 
tentiom towaid eadi ow, and other variables not stibject 
to precise mea~ure~ent. 
- . . *  
Sompl3ng or an irupdva T W q w  
l & n d o r n  &rapling is an accepted technique in indbstrial 
quality conwIs, foud and drug inspection, and so forth, and 
its wes in the field of arms ~oqkol .inspection are being in: 
tewively, exploredeM The idea behind 'this is that it k not 
necesary to i m p ~ t  everything in order to have hiqh war- 
ance that obligations are being fulfilled and violations are 
not occuning. Arms coq~ml inspection poses the hitberto un- 
encmtered sampling problem &at potential evaders may 
seek to "beat" the sampling systepl., Sampling strategies have 
to take this ~ i b i l i t y  into ~ o u , n t W  In general, however, 
&This ingenious d & m e  is kmda@d with the mame 'of 'Prsbr 
Loub Sobn ef Hamad ,U&mrsity. Sae hjs &-pter, "Phasing of Arms Reduc- 
tion: The Temturid Method," in David H. FdchI ed., d m  Reducth 
Program d Is.wml *. &t, pp. l%.ff. 
M 90 the $ e n d  mdea o£ b~mpling'r ~ ~ C C  to prms coatml ;Snspec- 
tion, see &a ter by %lomOn, in Melman, dt, pp. 425 & 
u-. Jnt h . k n  m d c  by W, ct Zqp. at., p. L I , d  L a  
C. Scbdhg and Mortaa H, Halperi~,~ Strategy and Amrr Control mew Vork: 
Twentieth Century Fund, 19612, p. 104. The latter stated the problem this 
way: "An important diibrena htureen ordinary statisdcal sampling, and 
the we of anm ling a* an intelligent r d v ,  is @at the activitiu 
king monimrd may adapt themselves to the he ling procedure that h 
cham. If them is a limit, for example, oa che n u m L  of nmplis &at an 
be taken within a given month or a year, and the limit has been exhausted, 
violatioar may proceed mi impuni until the next period btgint: . . . the 
party bdng exlmincd . . . ma7 dt&erately create suspicious evidence in 
order to @!xharut he smq4c." 1. ' 
the themyis that if a 
wals m violations in the ins 
evidence that violations am. 
of a violation in the. ml 
up danger signals. The 
pling would enable impede  
it is urged,u be high an- to 
fieiendy ancertain bf ruaresr to 
TEie tdt-1 impctIon scheme 
S t a t a ,  ddtbagh' it doa i n m k  elements 
dearly a scheme kn -&dm sampling.. '9ht - 
propkls spell bbt fsw'detilils and say mbg ctrrt.th pnd.h ? 
would divide thei berofap . 
191p~~aito z nes" EBt tarn1 
level ,of armaments, forces, and specified t p  of activities 
subject ib verification in 6ach ZOJW." 'I%&, an a@ d m -  
ber of z&ws would bk ' pmgrmiie'ly ibpected, the ones toJ bc 
inspected being chojcn "by ,procedures which would e n m  
their selection by Panics td the k t y  other than the Party 
whose territory was to be inspected ar any 'p&tf isgcsociattd 
with it." Once the zones to be '2weHd hqd ' Wit chogn, 
the country to be inspetted would give Wdils as 'ttrthe- ldca- 
tion of the forces, armanients, or activities io' be b p ~ t d .  
Arrangements would - be necessary to p r w d  ondb$wied 
movements a a m  zonal btlnikia The intipecta~~~ OM 
ouriy, muld -seek. to tbat the d e d w  objecq or a&$- 
w e e  where they ; ~ e m ' a a p d  to be and thatltheq m t  
. , 
none that did not ap+ar onithe decked &to Under tbir , 
scheme, the gpvernmgihts of the nmntrier hqyaed ~oald 
hawe urat~d ova the process. of &fining tbe axaka '& their 
coi~ntr%l and woptg; a6 .$~ubi*aeek ta dp w in ppip#'$fpt 
m a x i m a  their own security in' tenns of the QP&bLawil- 
able. The doer no5 specify whetha thq &1t33i9n of tht 
zones to be inspected wou1d.k ramdm m aot -(drown oat of 
a hat, for . 'It : thus leavier$ the pibi l i ty  'bat 
-
~ ~ t o t e ~ % m ~ h , t h e ! ' ~ & ~ ~ i a o a , i n ~ ~ & ~ , i ~ ~ f i .  
governments witn advance1 lntelligmce rcsourccs would 
seek to influence the &mice of zugm in ways that would en- 
sure that inspection efforts served their interests to the great? 
est extent possible. However it should be done, this scheme 
seems a promising step tod coping with the problem -!hat . 
too much .inspection, infor?fpation about sa;ltegic facilitiek at 
least in present c~~mmseancet, might be destabilizing, or, 
just as important, appear to be. Such a sampling techniqu~ 
also offen pr~mise of reducing the costs af'inspeftion. 
The sampling metbod, in this case aPP1id geopPicalli 
bas obvious relevapce to other criteria for d+hg iaipzctibq 
tasks* If factories producing certain obj* ha& 't!, be in- 
spected. it may be possible to achieve higbly reliable i m p  
tion without inspecting all of them. Similarly, with regard t? 
p e r f ~ ~ ~ a n c e  of obligations to reduce force levels or qma- 
ments, some sample units or depots could be ins~cted. 1s 
such cases something akin to the procedure propad  by the 
United States for zonal inspection would have to be followed. 
Declarations of total force and armament levels or of prduc- 
tion facilities would have to be submitted. And where deli- 
Ate deterrent relationships would not he affected, p k c G  
statements of locations and levels of activity in each facilit? 
&r installation might have to be provided. Then a selected 
mmple would actually inspected, and the conformance or 
non-conformance of the observed facts with the declared 
k t e  of affairs could .be established. Depending on the nature 
*f the activity being inspected provision would have to 
bade to avoid transfer of forces, armaments, or activitier 
from one place to a ( m e r .  The sampling scheme in some 
cases might have to provide for sampling inspection of unde- 
Jared facilities as well-factories that are not listed as pro- 
awing prohibited or regulated items, for example. Sampling 
anay thus be appropriate for a wide range of prahibitions'or 
iirnitaojS,m. PnesulluMy* th prbciple, of , tht United Stam 
zonal scheme should be maintained: while only r selected 
number of installations or facilities would be inspected ini- 
tially, all would be eligible for inspectian to permit the Sam- 
pling to be done among the entire range of relevant objectit 
. Tactbd or. St~ate& M ~ U T B I  
If bwc13 ' i s  ' to be depended on for tactical -.or short- 
t h  v i n g  & &tiitpished from strategic br lOng-tm 
warning, the t&hniial d i h l t i a  and costs will be great: 
Mormver, tactikd '%mm~edge may. fm reasons that are appar- 
tmt frbm theabape discursion of the relationship iif inspec- 
tion to rmiegie h&ilfty,w jeopaidize the security of strategic 
fotca. on whl& niutual deterrmce may d e d .  J-e 
Wianer bPl '&f& to general agreement "on the desirabil- 
ity of ofithlt$~& inspection and observation systems to those bf 
i sait@c ~~tmre-thtt is, those that monitor bdy such fao 
kars as location, ntlmben and quality of k e s  and weapdns," 
'$id on rvoidanh of a system that depends upon tactical in- 
fbrmatian requifing rapid transmission and quick r e a a i o ~ . ~  
E k w h m ,  Mr. Wiesner has made dear that thib ipnsideta- 
tion applies to arrangements such as those at one time po- 
far rcduciag risks of surprise nuclear attadcorn Any 
such measures would depend on high speed and very reliable 
communication and data procesing i ~ y s w ;  If military dis- 
gbaitions of the parties wau itery dependent on the reliabil- 
ity of such systems3 the systems would have to be very &liable 
indeed. Furthermare, Mr. Wiefitr argues that the inspeaion 
forcc.neded hid be as large as that required for general 
and complete dkmament. In proportion to the advantag& 
d£ such a spatem, its cdbts would be verg high. 
I .  
Time has important effects on inspection requirements. 
One o f  the mdperplming of dl arms control questions ir 
_1 
67 See pp. 45tE. 
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"~nspection for &armmolt" in Hmki11, dt., p. 114. (C) 1961 
of Prea ti=-Hall, ,bc. 
% The American A s s e m € d p , ' ~ C 9 1 ~ ~  Unive*- N. . kpmted by permission 
. 69 Xn Brcanaa, q. dt., p. 'm?. ;
to avoid obsolescence of the inspection arrangements. 
problem arises, in one form, in the intenml between the 
a particular inspection need is identified and when the 
ppropriate arrangements can be agreed upon and put into 
ffect. Recent experience with arms negotiations suggests that 
ch intervals are more likely to be long than short. 
Perhaps the most striking example of the obsolescence ef- 
ct w a ~  the nuclear stockpile problem. By 1955 it became 
clear that the amount of nuclear material in existence had 
shifted radically as governments came to acknowledge this 
fact. The dramatic turning point was the Soviet proposal of 
10 May 1955, which said 
there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control 
for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manu- 
facture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. . . . The security of the 
States signatories to the international convention cannot be 
guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential 
aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons 
for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States9 
As a result, negotiations focused on ways of arriving at par- 
tial measures of arms limitation until the Soviet Union again 
reverted to pressing for general and complete disarmament. 
There is no obvious answer to the problem posed by tech- 
nological and circumstantial changes that occur between the 
time inspection measures are conceived and the time they are 
put into effect. Nor, as has already been suggested, can it be 
e3dmq$I&. 
bit, the ultiplication of n d c l e ~  weago& hu I+ 
to relatively stable strategic relatiions8ips ltkia4 may 1- )the 
budem inspection arrangefpli&ai:haw to cow. Perhaps all. 
&a$ can 'liaehlly be said abodt this probiaa :ir*chn ,@m& 
a.bility of significant changes affecting the inspccth r q u b  
giienm has always to be borne in mind. ?"hcl &at 
$qptiatms may be pufiuing inspeaion arrhztgmm~ whIeh 
have already been rt!+ml&red absolete by -Into- and 
cfn:utmtantial &&ge 'is k t h e r  factor. mp1ihGag 
nekotiaepg -- and making it inordinately $%kIit(1;~1t td
teach satisfactory agreeme&ss. . I )  ' I  I 
I Of cop%,. thc probl& ' d& no!' ehd with izisti'tuBon 
of inrpectibn a m m g k t n ~ .  The lattet r isg . obsolk&ce 
just much aft& they'have been put' into eEect aa before, 
rnh that complete 'disarmament, including an effective 
p hibitton on arms resear& has not been instituted. To S k
this problem two responses seem relevant. One is to incar- 
p o w  provisions to &ake modification bf inspection arrange- 
ments pos~ible in agreements setting them up. This has been 
done ip the latest United States-United Kingdom draft treaty 
proposed for a complete nuclear test ban, which provides 
£m periodic review of the system (Art. XI)." No such specific 
provision i s  made in the latm United States draft outline 
for a general and complete disarmament treaty, although 
the notion of periodic review is by no means urc l~ded .~  The 
Soviet plan for general and complete disarmament seems at 
least to leave the question open in the provisions vesting in 
the Conference (Art. 41 (3) ) and the Control Council (Art. 
42 (g)) general author with respect to the control proce- 
dures. 
62 United Nations Doc. A/5200, 18 ,Sept. 1962 (ENDC/58, 2'7 Aug. lw . 
In fact, an obligation to keep the system under review at t t e z l e b  rage is 
implied in the proposed commitment "to ensure that the Intenrational Db- 
armament Organization would have the capacity to verify in the agreed 
manner the cvbligations undertaken." The words "in thg: agreed manner" may 
suggest a rather .more static approach than is implicit in the obligation to 
ensure the O ~ n i z a t i o n * ~  "capacity to verify." The language applying to 
the first stage IS slightly diibent from that quoted, but seems to have the 
s l s r w ~  
Another response is to ensure that the iqtemational con- 
trol agency has up-to-date scientific and te&nological com- 
petence, adequate to enable it to app&e the inspection 
arrangements realistically in the light of @anging science 
and technology relevant to a n n s .  Of course, meqber govern- 
ments which themhelves have advwced s~@ntiQc and tech- 
nological capabilities can introduce evidence ar. to needed 
changes in the decision-making organs of the control agencies. 
Such a procedure seems definitely contemplated in the review 
provision and other provisions of the most recent United 
States-United Kingdom draft treaty for a complete test ban. 
The earlier United StatekUnited Kingdom prop&, 4- 
vanced in April 1961, seemed also to envision an - actire role 
by the Administrator and the staff of the organizatibn. In 
that draft the Administrator was required to 
develop and arrange for the execution of a program of E W X W ~ ~  
and development for the continuing improvement of tlae equip 
ment and techniques used in all componenv of the System, and 
. . . from time to time make recommendations to the Colnfnis- 
sion regarding irhprvements to be incoiporated in the System. 
[Article 9 (5) .] 
The August 1962 proposal- vests copparable responsibility 
in the Commission rather than the s@@, although the staff 
is supposed to "=kt the..~omrnissi& .in carrying out i~ 
functions" &ti& V). While the United States draft outline 
of the general a d  copapLe.te dkamaglent treaty contains 
no such provision, it doa charge the Admi+t~ator with 
"inaking reports to. the Control Council on the progress of 
disarmament measures and qf their verification, and on the 
installation and operation of the verification arrangements" 
(italics added). The power to report is the power to raise 
issues for consideration. The Soviet p~opmd gives no such 
authority to the staff. 
Clearly, there can be no guarantee that agreed inspection 
systems will be modified to conform m changing needs. 
whether the needed adaptations involve refinements, or im- 
provements within the limits set by the basic agreements, or 
amendments in the basic instruments themselves. On the 
contrary, effding such changw 
since in interhational affairs, a1 
agreement is the mwt difficult d 
moreover, are unlikely as a rule to 
mme countries are more likely to be 
proposed &an* than others, andt'lome db 
interest in bringing 
Thus, the decision to effect 
san, warmly contested, political matter; 
determine their positions by assessing the 
and liabilities Political costs o 
ures to improve inspection s 
tion. But -proving to the 
audiences that any pro 
its absence the system 
eacy thing to do. Fat we- that& 
dons, if recent expeHMt~~iri& &e, t q  
any indicator, are unlikely+@ &C qdt.  
of ihe circumstintial changks liai$f$'i toL &e 'iieed 
in the system may not be technological, but politicnl, 
strategic, or economic, and getting agreement on the impli- 
cations of such &an@ may be even more d i h l t . '  
What will count most in bringing about c h a w  will be 
the determination of the principal p d a r  to demon~aatt 4 
to iach, other that Lhep are interested in pr&zx'_qnd 
developing the arms control $~WRI. H a ~ ~ v c r ,  hnonle~ tIte 
conditiom 'fiquiring &anp  ih the sy~temzti~ very apparent 1 j and v k y  central, t h y  may not, for i ra~adr  alrdhdp $+d, 4 
pose v q  dearmt rests of ihe pamies' intendow: @if& th$ j is the realm of ~cfid'lapical ckmmunication; the inmprm- - ; 
tian of evidmce will ulidwbtd#y be difficult and will seldetn 
taulr in mmhPaB;abJ,e concl&iam. In cases of exmeme whk- 
newr in the ryatem resulting from techaologid or &ier 
change, the t ~ k s  &n always assess whether the inade!iita- 
cia outwnec the advantages the system QW. The-the 
to withdraw hrom the system, or actual withdrawal, are 
ranctiotu available to state intensely intirest~d in btfnghg 
about hpvwnenb h 'lhe ' ~ c t h n  arrangemats;'Ha*r- 
ever, for reasom spelled gut in earlier M X ~ @ I M  n&,@ 
resort to them sanctions will be, at mat, ix$qeqqe% ,,. , , , , i ji 
Tim entor the paxa in wether way. Time 1~17 4*:b 
mo* prc~iwr -t to be &ieri~d from kp~tisp* WB$ 
thae b a wiolation it i b e  -its g o v r q a t g  
i&tutc amgl@tius m-ra In thk connection, it @ 
the victimn that them h ,a long mad Iropp 
rn m e&sctive military qpocity. If ,o1 aqu. 
~ e a & # c - m v  b iinvdvad, or a new w 
&in. of - e m &  lea&., tbm31ghh bluepcbm 
Cbigna,' prototype prodwtkn ,and tap- 
~eex*g of a c  production layoutr, p b 4 7 m ~ c t i o a  (WW 
special difficulties under the, circumstanca of iup 
menti.. development of doctrines for tbe ewpby~ 
writ ob tho weapons, production of enough weapons tp 
a c h i ~ q  r c;  e f k a ,  training of personnel, to actu# 
dcrpbp~w ~f ,f finished aptems which might, in 
indve, , q l e x  installailtiom. Violations a n  ?&in .at 
anp p i m t  im (hjr d e m a t i c  chain of events. But even efforts 
to violate rwaints on existing weapons systems imply 
of preliminary meawrp before a decisive military advantage 
cap de deployegi or demonstrated. The other side of this coin, 
however, is that once a critical military advantage is achieved 
by violation of an a m  agreement, the victims conkunt a 
camparable chain of requirements before they cw redress 
the balance by equivalent means. The victims may gain k m c  
advantage vis-%;vis the violator from their ability to respond 
ovtrtly. Nevq-theless, should a violator achieve a decisive 
military advantage, the victims' security would be en&* 
gered and peace would be threatened. $i would appear, therefare, that the funha back in the 
&aip bf @latiom inspectioh can be effectively initiated, 
ad''thelmotc pinu at which inspection efforts a n  made, 
L h r . . h r 3  ,will the s-rs bc. The obvious quatior; t h e  
fore, is whether prepaqahm to violate cannot ;shkmeIva 
be p6rahibited. 
Thi issue arax in acute form with respect to the mora- 
torium on nuclear tests. When the Soviet Union resumed 
testing on 1 September 1961, President Kepnedy several 
times expressed concern over the advantage that country had 
gained by testing after a long period of secret preparation. $iif!&I 
In his press conference on 7 February 1962, the President 
referred to the need fa "methds of inspection and contrd 
which could proten us agaimt the repetition of prolong ' 
secret pmp~atiom for a sudden series of major tes&'- 
Subsequently, in hia radio-television address of 2 March 
1962, tbe Pmident, rtfming to the proposals the UnitLd 
States an4 che-zUriited Khgdom would introduce in the 
Gene% n e ~ i ~ t i o a s ,  &id ttiatr"nav modifications win 
be d k r ~  g h  tht gghe'of new ex~erience,"~ thus giving rise 
to speculatbn &at the United States would propose new 
mea&k& to' prohibit preparations for testing. 1n the event, 
no such proposals were made, m, doubt because of the diffi- 
culty of .defining prepariatiom b r  the' purpose of such a 
prohibstion, and &&se such a prohibiiiod would involve 
imp t ion  amangemme even more onerous than those which 
it had heady proved difficult to negotiate with the Soviet 
Uniod. 
In theory it should be possible both to incorporate in 
a m  agreements limitations oh measures antecedent to the 
actual production or deployment bf prohibited weapons'and 
to m& arrangements to i ~ p e a  such meqsures. Such w- 
ondary ihiditationsi howevw, might operate to'the disad&- 
tage df~states ,that $lfill their obligati~ns, since successful 
violation of secondary prohibitions would have a bigger 
pay& would violatian df 'the primary prohibitions 
alone. The coniinued' exiistence ' of' r&a=ch and production 
hcilities. a d  stc@cpiles QC weppn components would enable 
the vicfip. of vk&tiods, to take. compensatory step more 
rapidly than mu$d be mible ,  if all such s e c o n ~  capabili- 
MUS. Annr Ct~nmol and D-t Agency, I%armment '%en€ 
series W d  57. 
als "Nuclear T and D b ~ m e n g *  US. Arms Control and Dbarma- 
ment Agency, Ge= Saia No. 2, Mar. 1962, p. 17. 
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ties lh-83ken i3lmInate&#r;wevex, cii;i;&i3'jirnin the 
&mndarg capabilities might also operate to the relative 
disadvantage of the Westerrl coutntrks, which pmbably find 
it more difficuh::W& &3ta1itarian oountries to main& 
&pedal1 ye of scientiota and tech- 
; aiaence of iRspected scc- 
id I& &ch bppormnitks to detect 
1vidbti8rlir't&aw~1d otherwise be 
::d iL:* 
.Tikih% &i sii&l factors into ~ccoudt, &hefoore,it might 
der 'd  desirable to move toward 'agreements that prOe5bit not 
oiilf the prbduction and deployment of weapons, bat also 
those '~condary measures which lend themselva to reliaYde 
ihpection. As the scope of a m s  agreements broadetls, so 
wit1 the scope of the inspection arrangements and the n k w  
bef of inspection tasks to be performed. The existen& df a 
of interacting inspection techniques and spa- 
make it possible to extend the reach .of ,the 
s+ti& to include such secondary meas'ures as stodrpiling 
cif ' critical components, testing of prototypes of prohibited 
dkdpons, training of personnel, tooling up of facilities for 
pduction of prohil ed weapons, and preparation of weap 
o* $&&tl 
h e  key to4 succ~fu l  performance of these inspection 
fu$tio& will be the identificatiiin of those critical set~nd- 
ary $neasures that have utility only in connection with ihi 
prohibited primary act or .in some other way give unmirtal- 
able evidence of an intention to violate an established 
imary prohibition. This will be formidable task and, e . , 6ew r e +  . of h &,,*tics of distinguisbint among   ti 
- M a h t  Kennedy n&mw qx&iMly to &is problem "Some may mpp 
us, ,to try it [pa unrnrieted m o t ~ u r n  on nuclear tests] again, keeping cnu 
preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, 
particulatty jlP a d e t y  oC k e  choice, we cannot keep topflight reimthb 
concentgang ,on the preparation 04 an ezwment which may os ms not 
take place on an uncertiun date in the future. Nor can law u c h n i d b b -  
oratodes be kept fully ahst mi a sandby W s  waiting for some &her mtkm 
to break an agreement. This is ngt m q l y  cult or inawroenieat,+ hawe 
expla* this alternative thoroughly a6d found it irnpomible of execution? 
19td.; 1% 
FW the t ime 7b& 
e&a6 &atd  b; eirde 
lfnk the technical and politkal d l j o *  jip!V.'W .t$lyicl 
do IIDt -L urn-* .the PWW to &ductd&&& 
tivities m y ,  for some time to  me. be a 'timtki- . , I ,  
to govemmenrs that they will be able to rcbpad*& I ,  
ately to violations of primarp prohibitlorn b). 6- 
ments. 
Cornpbte srr, PrrrtZaa 
\ 
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It seems likely that, in most,circumstancebt total 
tions will be eacier to impect than partial ones .and 
of violations easier to interpret. The dificulty of 
nating between what is permitted and what is prohibitd i s  
thus eliminated, or at least reduced.67 Morpover, to dimqq 
a small number of prohibited items or the small-scale-pre- 
formance of a prohibited activity is to discover clear evidence 
of a violation only when the item or the activity hw been 
totally prohibited, In general, the task of inspection willr& 
facilitated by the dearest and most complete possible d & ~ &  
tion of what regulations are agreed upon. If the likelihood- 
of friction in the implementation of arms agreements k to 
be kept to a minimum, moat arms agreements will have to 
be lengthy and complex documents. 
The reliability of inspection arrangements can dten be 
incremd by bringjing to bear the mutually supporting p 
tentialities of the, various appropriate techniques. Considrr; 
for example, a ptbhibition of further production of vehicles 
for delivering nuclear warheads. The primary means of in- 
specting suc6 a lkitation would be i;hysital inspection of 
plants k n m  to have the capatiility to produce such weapons. 
This technique might be reinforced by efforts to keep mck 
of the activities of persoanel known t c ~  have experience in 
such production, by checking on inventory records of c r i h l  
67Epfen mal pdsibitiow may not eliminae grounds for d-t as 
to what is permitted. Durn a prohibition on cEe3Jv.ery vehida inelude a 
prohibition on manufacture of cmqmnenW On b c h i n g  @? On miirsik 
fesearch? On training missile crews? For a suggestive analym of thia gemmi 
problem, see ScheIling and Halperin, op. tit, pp. 109-113. 
eoaapats  Q£ the w e 8 W  and of major fpaehbe toolr 
nehdcd for urch p-tjot~,~ seeking to detect &&-opt 
tcsu of amplet+ or. newly cslclpkted v @ i d ~ r , ~  4 by 
aerial and perhaps spacebared ~uweillance to detect luge- 
acale produaim activitia and unusual moyicmentr of critical 
known to k perti- 
of thew techniques 
may well be others that 
: % ~ a ~ 2 8 t h  W O P X ~ ~  
" , for example, might invdve 
f snch pFoduction. , . I 
"fhle 8- as w ~5b&c'@&14r cofiftt&mation 04 h p  
' ~ p 1 ~ y : i n  aay hmmee ymfd havc io 
ntkeaitle~ and. opportunities, jfzdgmemts 
.be: the wiurmce &at violaticin -d: be 
the mi- pa&lc  ~ g m e m a ;  Hmww, the pripdpk 
that the degm of achievement of the several gasnls oE ha- 
spection is likely to increase with the number of alternative 
of ;imp&m is an important one since the more 
diffkent kinds of limitatim are bring w e ,  the more 
d2E;ancat techniqqer d m a ; n  will be. in, w *ur 
% 
. . .  
fhek are mrnponend fh&-itrii'*$ideF "dpeddp ch*teri&d oC. ih 
object being controlled, "e~ecially difficult %O rodztw ,tm .both." &e Mpw 
by Phdp, in Frisch, op. at., p. 110. Phelps & not bjkw iaspecdap of 
&tical components is a very significant tech& ae Ibecaa$e & ttre -tim 
ease with which they a n  either be d i s p d  wi;h ar mbUitoted hr. * . 
Phelps points out that this may 
of inspection, as production techni 
mutJUK a d  as tBe v @ h k b  
&&, . I l l .  
~ P & i n F r i ~ & ~ d t , , p 8 7 .  ' . 
mitted by any one? Moreover, Mr. Wiesner has pointed 
to the opportunities this principle offers-when it is possible 
to exploit the interaction effects of inspection techniques 
appropriate to a range of different arms limitations-to 
economize on the total effort needed to achieve desired levels 
of confidence in inspection. It should be recognized, however, 
that this principle tends, as John B. Phelp h a  recognized, 
to contradict the argument that progress in a+ reduction 
\ can best be made by singling out individual measures that 
lend themselves most readily to agreement. 
l ' *  , 
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M v w  OF mm CXW&CUKWWV ~ v e r  arrangements &r inte~na- 
tional inspection of l a m  regulations has ftxused on the 
o rgank i t id  . hmres: whether, for example, inspeaion 
should be " i w ~ a & m d "  or "national," and whether in- 
spectixqg and oqpnhtion s t a 5  should be "impartial" 
or b u M ,  as the Soviet Union has proposed, rdect what 
they call the mrld's division into ''camp." Inmpably, 
g0-a~ ba$e had to be concerned with the implications 
for other invrnational organhatiom of decisions mnming 
the pmjeceed international control agencies. The issues have 
been confused fexrthier by the failure to distinguish clearly 
between the arms control functions on the one hand, and 
rbc development of measure8 far the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and world order, as armaments diminish, on 
the other. It is especially important to differentiate between 
the requirements of arms regulation in the emly stages and 
the requiremenu that would k generat& should there be 
major national dimmammt. 
RsdprOCQl w. lntsrnaffmonal inspection 
For historical reasons, negotiations on arms regulations 
have until lately been concerned exclusively with proposals 
for multilateral agencies and multilateral inspection arrange- 
ments to superintend the process of national disarmament. 
Late in 1961 the Soviet Union reversed its previous accept- 
ance of the principle that a nuclear test ban should be super- , 
vised by an international control organization, and proposed 
instead q a t  inspection be carried on by existing nati~nal 
increasing attendon: In A u p t  1%MiB, .t&e .Unit& and 
the United Kingdom introdmaxi. & new prqxaab on the 
cessation of testa in all media which bJ& basic monitoring 
by national means with a superim .inta~mtjow1 control 
agency that is to have Borne direct monito~ng .capabilities 
and guaranteed accm rights for on-tbcspot imipcction. The 
United StatesUnited Kingdom propoed!ir a respgxzse to a 
memrandum submitted by the eight soaUcd 'fanaxramit- 
ted" participants in the Eighteen-Naw @&e~ence in 
Ceneya on 16 April 1962.7s The new pachp~&* .-everb 
Y. Furthemore, the feasibility. of eon(titutlng by an interd 
tistrar mpnm-, W r e d  number of high17 qadBed 
wmtpza, t et with the a 
ma on =d be mtms~f l tk~  
inf;bfiP che *ties ts the treaty of all-the & m a  of the ylnd'sf 
ita assmment of the cmxmmd event. * .  ,.' . 
#*The parties to the meaty muld be free to &termhe t&e& &&an 'Wh 
regard to the treaty on the ba& of reports *shed by /tit&. h't&badm& 
CQ-." ENDC/FV.21, 16 Apr. 1962, pp. 21-22. 
departs from the eight-nation memorandum in its .insistence 
upon paranteed access and a provision for an intergovm- 
mental control organ father than a "non-po1itical" scientific 
agency as proposed by the eight uncommitted nations. 
The various proposals for test ban arrangements no doubt 
reflect the particular tech~nial problems inherent in an 
agreement on this subject. But involved also are the basic 
purposes of impection, which art relevant to all agreemena 
to regulate arms. The issues un be examined independ- 
ently of the technical amsideratiam unique to a t a t  ban. 
An important 'kpestion is whether it is always necessary 
tbat the arnmpments s h d  involve elements of "&par- 
tial" collection and appraisal of the inspection data,18 as 
distinguished from "reciprocal" arrangements under which 
the parties inspect each other. The latter are sometimes 
called "sides inspection." It appears that, if the primary 
purpose of the inspection arrangements is to provide reas- 
surance to the main parties thzt obligations arc being ful- 
rdproeal inspeaion in some circumstances may not 
only be as good as impartial arrangements but many even 
o h  advantages. For one thing, the world's main armammts 
problem involve reciprocal relations between the two great 
power blocs-the Communist states and NATO-and many 
of the lesser arms problems involve direct relations between 
two states ar group of states, such as those betweem Imel on 
the one hand and her Arab neighbors on the other, and 
betwet% India and Palrisean. Reciprocal rontrol arrange- 
ments, therefore, might apply to h e  urns regulations 
which are ,essentially reciprocal in charpaera 
If certaih conditions exist, it is no more diffitult to meet 
the technical requirements for inspection through reciprocal 
~ F O T  oonvdmce, such system will be reSe2Tct8 to hemafter aa " ' i m p  
W," d- that is is h'y simplified description of a range of complex 
~ i b i ~ ~  On this gens mbjle*, sce Fred C. IUC, Altsnutfia df$macksr 
to the Inbeprra th i  Organixatron of Disa~mmtmt ( h t a  Monica, Calif.: 
Thc RAND Corporation, February 1962); La(owencc S. Finlcelstdn, "The 
Urn 434 Reciprocal I &n," D w d s b  (Nwemk 1982) ; and BuU, "Two 
&inch of- Con=*&. 
74 See pp. 15ff. 
arrangements than through impartial ones. T h e  fint 
tion is that the parties be relatively few and or-& 
sides. as are the kaior Dower blocs, although there r n d  & 
exceptions to this prin~iple.'~ The other condition ir dhqt 
inswction should not require too deep or extensive & 
& i o n  of the sovereigntior terrain o i  the parties. 1f -vh; 
is involved is intimate-inspection of United States e l e c t r w  
companies, for example, or detailed interviewing of unite& 
States citizens employed by the Atomic Energy Commission, 
the people of the United States and the Congress are liWy 
to prefer international inspection teams to teams of Commu- 
nists. In any case, it seems that agreements that are likely 
to be negotiable in the early stages of the progression toward 
Igeneral and complete disarmament will not involve deep 
penetration. Given the existence of these two conditions 
there is no reason to believe that the difference between 
impartial and reciprocal patterns of inspection would signi- 
ficantly affect the likelihood of the parties agreeing to what- 
ever inspection facilities may be necessary. Marginally, the 
reciprocal approach appears to offer some advantage from 
the point of view of easing the negotiations, since the parties 
would not have to negotiate about such organizational ques- 
tions as staffing, budgeting, and voting, which have plagued 
all the Dostwar negotiations on disarmament. 
a In addition, reciprocal inspection arrangements might 
offer some operational advantages. Since the parties would 
be employing their own trusted personnel, the hazards of 
sabotage of the inspection systems, incompetence, and un- 
weliability would be reduced. Governments would be better 
able to appraise the reliability of the information collected, 
and there could be no doubt that information collected un- 
der the system would be directly and promptly available to r
the governments." Reciprocal systems might be less vulner- 
- 
75 The Antarctic Treaty provides for a kind of reciprocal inspec 
under impartial schemes but 
~tes-United Kingdom draft test 
obscure on this score. See W6, 
the 
ban 




oE placing the emphasis where it 
*ality -that an adversary relationship exists, drat (the! *- 
sibillty rests on rhc parties for reassuring s~ch~othm 
obligations arc being obsetvd agd";Wtt;ttrak L G m 
interest in continuing && apeqm&a.t, +Ont 
might be that the partia 'webH ~ 4 ~ 4  &-
to negotiate with each ~the, 
the system. Negotiating migh 
nities the direct relationship h d l d  offer the 
public exacerbation of their diEemeqi. lf 
so inclined. The existence of formal mu 
for considering such matters might make .privaed li@akm 
mom difficult and might, indeed, provide .pl ba%ti€!ik 
temptation to resort instead to partisan a 
other hand, the reciprocal relationship 
advantages of the pressures fos acmmm 
no doubt develop in a multilataal f o m , . d  
parties would presumably retain the free- to rsek~Ihm 
tial + p c d  offices, conciliation, or mediationi 
The facx ,that inspection is reciprocal does not exclude 
the possibility that the primary parties might choose to s& 
third-party support for their positions. For i n s ~ c e ,  the 
adversaries might choose to gs8ocistc U~BCTS with them in 
the inbrmation collecting eE~rt; they might reveal or 
share collected information with selected or with all gsvcp~l- 
ments. In eases where impartial suppart may bq an important 
faaor in strengthening the will of a p v v e n t  to respond 
to a violation, it would be free w. peek qu+ ~ b ~ p r ! ?  . .  Recip . , 
rocal arrangements thus would leave ,qQie,iptlon4 opp to 
governments and, by doing go, might in&eare.,* &wen& 
effect of the inspection arrangements. l L e c i ~ $ p a n g z -  
ments do not necessarily exclude servini the, m ~ b m  
purpose of inspection-to provide evidence ?bouti, &e pys- 
tern's operation to a wide audience-while s m @ ~  %h pri- 
mary purpose which i s  to provide the principally c--d 
governments with the evidence they need to' a&mije' I&(! 
(i' ' 1 
system's perf-ce in relation to their nati-1 'interes~. 
Clearly though, among agreements to limit ,a&$: ;&ere 
will be some impartial systems, either because the dbjetti bf 
control are spread among too many countries to w i t  a 
reciprocal system; or because the depth of penetration would 
be enough to require that the inspection apparatus %ave:an 
impartial cachet; or because, as in the case of the test ban, 
some governments are too deeply committed to the h@aw 
tial fonnula to permit the adoption of alternatives. H e  
the basic lemons of reciprocity may still be applicable. Even 
impartial systems should be designed to permit the principal 
adversaries to be reassured, and to reassure each o&m* as 
to the working of the system and to facilitate the h ' 8 e w  
of the most reliable possible information to the gv-mtrs 
with m a t  at stake. 
To return briefly to the test ban, it should be \clear from 
this analysis that the idea of a reciprocal system is not naes- 
k l y  undesirable at all. The reverse may be true. The .in- 
adequacy of the Soviet pmposal for national insption: is 
not that it provides for a reciprocal system but that t&e 
reciprocal system it provides for may not be adequaw to 
permit high assurance that the obligations of the propwed 
treaty are being fulfilled. That is because it allows for no new 
inspection facilities beyond existing national inspeetion re- 
sources. In any case, there is reason to doubt whether very 
great assurance, with respect to underground exp1osio.q~ at 
least, is achievable at all. Like 'many other a m  limitation 
issues, what is finally involved is how much risk the par 
ties are willing to accept. Here the question is whether the 
risk that the Soviet Union might successfully violate an 
agreement which prevents the United States from testing 
outweighs the advantages of having the USSR under the 
obligations of the treaty with its imperfect but still relevant 
provisions for detecting violations.* 
Although there is, this analysis suggests, scope for the : 
operation of reciprocal national inspection systems in the 
supervision of agreed measures of arms limitation, the inter. 
national dialogue still focuses mainly on impartial systems3 
The remainder of this chapter, therefore, will concentratd 
on some ot the organizational problems of the latter. i 
I Impartial Staffs 
7 I 
The backbone of any international organization is its 
international staff. This is especially true of the staffs of 
projected arms control agencies, because of the burden the % 
sta& will have to carry in performing the main function of. , 
such agencies-providing information about the fulfillmen ' 
of obligations under the basic arms control agreement : -- - 4: Governments will for some time to come make their o 
decisions as to whether the structure of obligations an 
inspection procedures continues to serve national interest#"- 
and hence to justify their continued participation. The con- 
trol agencies exist mainly to supplyLthem with the informa- 
tioh, supplementing information that may otherwise be 
' 
available to them, on which such decisions can be based. , 
While the stafb will have important functions in servicing 
77 The editors of The New Refiublic commented as follows on the August 
1961 United States-United Kingdom proposals: "In continuing to seek the 
facade of an international control system, the Administration has, in our ' 
view, unnecessarily encumbered US negotiators. . . . The United States has ' 
never proposed an international inspection system capable of detecting an ' 
Soviet tests, and the possibilities for violation left by a national inspection 
system do not seem to us to expose the US to greater danger than would ' 
the proposed international system." See "Policing a Test Ban," I3 Aug. 1962, 
pp. 6-7. This editorial places the issues in correct perspective by anphuir- 
m g  that the difference between what it terms "national" and "international" 
, 
spstems is not what determines the effectiveness of the system, 
the systems' organs and in perbming tbc, 
housekeeping function# tbat go with pay me-scale enter- 
prise# their r&un d'&ae will be the w 1 1 ~ t i ~  and handling 
of information. 
Staff arrangements should be judged by thir Ytandard and 
no decisions about the composition or management of the 
staffs should be allowed to interfere wi& the efficient ful- 
fillment of these responsibilities." What doa &ir.inply? 
It is well to begin with the acknowledgment that.& idea 
of a perfectly clear set of constitutional iI1struaW .withe 
staff for the performance of its inspeaion duties irr ilksory. 
Every effort should, of course, be made to clarify th~dature 
of the inspection task-when, how, and by whom i-ction 
is to be undertaken, and what is to be done with the Wults. 
But, in the last analysis, agreed provisions in the b d c  in- 
struments will be obscure or incomplete; they will m a y  
not be able to provide for all the changing circmmstattc&~ 
which the inspection amngements will have to dml; -h 
biguous or imprecise instructions will often emanate &Y&I 
the representative organs, among other readom ~ U W  thc 
instructions will often have to be couched in language tbrr 
compromises political difkmnces. Although every&% ~pab. 
sible should be done to reduce the burden of judgm-t the 
staff will have to carry, the place of human judgmmt in .die 
£ait]hful execbtion of assigned responsibilities a ~ &   
eliminated. 
This last consideration argues for a staff that is not de- 
pendent on internal consemus as a basis for the perf~matice 
of inspection functions. At the top it implies an ahinism- 
tive head able to take decisions within the lim$ts of his > .  
authority." This consideration definitely argues against a 
collegial-type authority that would have to achieve unaqim: 
ity before issuing instructions to the staff. The Soviet "troika" 
Tbia int h a  been W e  by Wncoln P. RloodcId. See his The Psk'&s 
of A- gi~~l, bp. dl. pp. 19-23. 
78 The United States-United Kingdom proposals of August 1982, to 'baa 
wa la all environments, mck to e s m W  such authoriq &rr thR emzadtrr 
oScm of the 0qpni;ration. - 
thing, it f&wg horn what has bpen raid-. abq~t'.tlq ,r& qf 
infgmsa&m : Iyis-B-vis participating gpv-giq, :- 
vidualr who ue formal represen 
than members of the intmatio 
A wiant of this scheme was actually 
United States and the United 
ban treaty proposed in April 1961. 
anced at all levels and in toto: o 
would be nationals of the USSR, another 
nationals of the United 'Kingdom and the W 
remainder would be from o 
would be headed by nationals of countries athm: 
in which each post was locate 
cal stafb of on-site inspection teams in Sovia 
be composed entirely of British or United 
and vice versa. Thus, this ostensibly rnultil-& 
agency would incorporate an avowedly recipro~al 
with respect to s&g arrangements. L f t 3'tiyvd 
The United States-Unitad Kingdora draft treaty foUdwCbd 
the general thmst of the United Nations Charter in ,kyim# 
d m  the principle that: 8 : , .GL.~~;~ 
The Administrator and the s M  shall not seek or F&W h m  
tionr concerning the peifomance e£ their duties ~~ 
authority external to the Organization. They shall r e f r r ~  .- 
any action which might. reflect oq their s t a t ~  ,at .iqtepi3#4~4 
officials and employees responsible only to the Or anization. 
Each Party underrakes to respect the international' C f  of 
the responsibilities of the Agrninistratmr and stag mddn6t &&@ 
to Mueme them in the $Lischarc &.their duties. fk. G(+]-. i i  
At the same time, the proposed arrangemenu regadhgmh 
tiomlity distributiom and functions unmistakably implied 
that some members of the staff at least were to have a na- 
character. This arrangement was bound to lead to confbian 
and make for real uncertainty among staff membm, vr~to 
how they could fulfill the obligations regarding imp&tia]:ify. 
This amalgam of provisions represented, amorig ,othez 
things, a Western campromise with the Soviet insist-e on 
a tripartite ideological distribution in the staff. Western 
insistence on maintaining the principle of impartid6ty was 
no doubt influenced by concernover the implications fog the 
1 M e a p e d  Umtd Nations S e c r a d  of .&&und that : 
might be reached with respect to the nuckar tat ban I . 
It might be better to acknowledge m d W y  that notionnl , 
reprentation is a legitimate and useful function in h st&, ! 
provided national disagreement ir hot p b i t t c d  to oh- 
the performance of the inspection fuectholp. The ~erult 
might be a staft with two delontirThe first, with the Ad- 
minirator at the top, should be impartial, composed pob. 
ably of nun-nationals af the major parties. The sacond & ~ l d  
be avowdy  nat iod  in c ~ m p i t i o n  and h m 5 1 ~ ~ t 9 ~  ~0XXlpb- 
ing prcdomjn%ntAp naticmib of the principal parties, but sub 
ject to ths administrative direction of the impartial memberr. 
A better d t d w  might be a completely impartial st&, 
provided adequate arrangements muld be ma& for the 
unimpeded flow of all inspection data to the participating 
governments either directly or &ram& their representative 
in the eolleaive organs. However, such a 8taE could hardly 
be created without including a large n u m b  of nationals of 
Communist countries. Since the Communist countria do 
not accept the principle of impartiality, the staff would at 
best be part impartial and part national in its orientation. 
Thus, a purely impartial staff seem unattainable. Frank 
recognition of this fact from the outset might help to avoid 
an obscure situation and could capitalize on the advantages 
of national representation in inspection staffs in terms of the 
usa to which inspection informatian is to be put. The argu- 
ment that the impartiality d  arm^ control stafi must be 
maint.imed because of implications for the United Nations 
Secretmi+ ir open to quation, parth1aly since at best Mlch 
impivWty an be only partly hlfilled. In any care, while 
verbally advocating it in their 1961 proposals for the tat ban 
mpizatiun the Wtsttrn powerr, a c t t d y  conceded the prin- 
dpk. The later p p a I s 9  advanced in August 1962, do not 
repeat the oomplicared povhiow regarding nationality dis- 
tribution. T h y  p v i *  only that consideration should be 
given to selming pmnnel who are nationals of participat- 
ing staterr. (An. VI (3) ); thrt personnel should be obtained 
on ;ro wide a geographical basis as possible (Art. VI(4)); and 
that on-site inspection teamr should be dom 
territory would not be inspected by n a t i d ,  of tb#t 
which controls it (Art. VIII (10) ). 
It is clear that the primary purpose of ins 
-the supplying of information to go 
subverted if decisions concerning the pe 
tion functions were subject to obstruction by vera: 
applies to the representative political or- ar wen ~rp- 
the administrative staff. However, it should be 
that the ability to obstruct is a corollary of bei 
power. Moreover, other states may often be in a 
to obstruct inspection without exercising a farma1 vtth ;k 
state on whose territory an onaite inspection is'bcing con- 
ducted, for example, has an ability to obstruct. The difference 
between a Tight and an ability, however, while nunn*~in 
some ways, is important because of its effect on the r&n 
of other states to obstructionist tactics. 
Vetoes may significantly affect inspection systm in# &B 
direct ways. For example, the Soviet Union's insistence am 
the right to veto the over-all budget for the nudear tat barn 
organization, whatever its justification, carries with it &e 
capacity to hamstring the inspection functions. The stmi 
is true of the veto over the appointment of the chief-of ctn 
system's staff. The principal powers certainly have rm 
portant interest in this appointment. But by refusing .to 
agree to any candidate, any of them might be able to rcnda 
the inspection system inoperable. 
What is significant about such veto rights is &at they 
provide a legal screen behind which noncompliance with 
the system's obligations may be hidden by any nation b a g  
the veto power, if it is so inclined. Although mch c d w t  
will be taken as evidence of a nation's intent to obstruct the 
system and will carry the risk of whatever consequences may 
seem appropriate to the other parties, much opportunity for 
obscuring the basic issues will inhere in such veto pruvisioi~. 
The victims might find it very difficult to convince o&er 
governments, or even the populations of their own comtries, 
that such tactics, legally permitted under tbe terms of,the 
qpeplezka jwtidy the hamtbs response a e  obviously 
appropsiate to prohibited actst 
So long as governmental dedi$om in~mgonsc to insperion 
inkmmtim are not dcpeqdent upon collective judgmmts, 
it appears to be k 1 m m t ,  whether or not unanimity is 
~~ in decisions: of'caatrd agency organs about the 
infiamntm wlkcteib Obviously, $to the extent that govan- 
m e d  adan d e w &  m:dmisioxm of international orgam. 
vemes wai.&idt-. Bw rs hod been suggam& such 001- 
rmk mare likely to con- lrapomm to 
than to major ona No wikective enforce 
merit ~ ~ ~ . I o E  imy-slbnificana are naw pmible, d.altbo;us21, 
or saacticpw not hvplving tha use of fmce 
h?iae~wes might bc applicable, A 
04 thr wWe it seem preferable to M v e  thc control sp. 
tans apexshe to reiReom:e the presstxres on the major powar 
to fl~!aamre ach other and to negotiate theit-minor dig=- 
emceg: This .$ag@pb thot lit* reliance n d  be p k c d  on 
aolledive drcidow;-even as to-tlre inteqxeta:tion of evidence 
d m d  by the inspection systems. , , 
In anp case, a great powm cannot be forced to. act against 
ig:pUiU Whber r veto is ifbrmaS,lp. ipWuced in the pro= 
in fact exist. Thk 
as to, w b e h  
stage have been falaled as the pro 
to tbE 1IYentgtpge. what eve^ lzalguage 
that the pmgsl.dcm 
, no psqp?s8 will in 
, I .  Rdutiow With l n r t e r ~ o ~  Organidns  
The performance of inspection functions would not be I 
significantly affected by str6ctural relationships between con- 
I 
trol organizations and the United Nations.80 The United ! i 
80 On this subject, see Finkelstein, "The United Nations and Organiza- 
dons for the Control of Armaments," fnternational Organization, Vol. XVI, , 
No. 1 (Winter lw. 
I  
DishWament  tion on (ID0 
the hamework of &c 'United Hat 
permits anp: of a numb& of re 
Assuming no O ~ C ~ V C  ptdurer  are 
relationship s ~ m s  an9 more or soy ias 1 
to hditnte the p&orbance of thc inspeedam 
a & w t e  'fnkhtian. 
ae krpr opm, >nevi?nhdear,* 
two organizations might be 
in the eirirtenct of the new agency. For one th& 
operation would make possible the most efficient 
ment of the available technical and, more especidl 
resourca. Secondly9 the new agency i s  likely to 
the experience and expertbe IAEA will by thep 
mulated. T h e  rvne conriderations would apply 
separate oapnbmtion to rupervire a nuclear ten 
into being More the general disarmament or 
There ie another consideration that various 
thee problems have emphasized. The new 
agency will have a hard time recruiting and 
81 See Regor3 of the d&my Committee O S ~  US. PO 
t tmdtmd Atomic B n q y  Agmtp (Wauhingmn: US. 
Ma 1962). Jme btat Unit4 States-Unitcd 
- . ; y , - . - . .  .. ' . J ~ I < Y ~ ~ : + P V ~ $  ) k r
, 8 ,:~~;,$$$g 
, vf 
Prinrb of highly trained penomel it will require if it an 
oEez &em only relatively routine inspectiondutie~.~ More- 
aver, the agency will have to maintain an up-to-the-minute 
knowledge of advances in science and technology relevant 
to armaments, which will probably require the establish- 
ment of advanced research facilities within the agency. In 
the field of nuclear knowledgea IAEA has constructive re- 
sponsibilities md research facilities, both of which will no 
doubt develop progressively over the years. Thus, IAEA's 
functionr.in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy might, 
if they were incorporated in the disarmament organization, 
provide partial solutions for both of these prablems which 
ID0 is certain to face. IDQ's inspection functions would 
doubtless involve cooperation of hrious sorts with other 
intematiopll agencies, such as the International Telecom- 
munication Union and the World Meteorologid Organi- 
zatioh., While closer study of this problem might lead to 
diffment condusions, it seems likely that such needs could 
be met by coopention agreements, perhaps in the pattern of 
the agreements between the United Nations and the spe- 
cialized agencies. 
a B i n S E M ,  "The United N a W  and OrgtnizaEfma for thc Control 
' 
of Armaments," o& cit, pp. 11-18, and Fcld et ~ 1 . ~  Op. cil, p. 21. 
THE THEME OF THIS ANALYSIS has been the tension 
two Western conceptions of the assuian~ demanded 
control inspection systems. One conception, a min 
one, emphasizes the desirability of limiting inspec 
quirements to whatever is needed to ensure tha4 viola 
agreed limitations do not pose significant threats to 
security and to the balance of mutual deterrence. 
ond emphasizes the desirability of providing high assuranc4 
that obligations are being performed and that violations wil\ 
be detected whether or not they significantly affect the se-' 
> , r  
curity of the parties and the balance of power. ; '  
Boih conceptions accept the basic principle that !&C "@-' 
arinament process has to begin with partial measurei;. f&&dg 
; b < n  
relatively intact the present reliance on nation4 plibt&$ 
forces to maintain security 'and the international @& w< 
ance. Both approaches acknowledge that perfect inspecdi& 
is not feasible and both seek to reduce risks by maintaining 
national capabilities adequate to keep within acceptable lim- 
its the possible consequences of violation. Both ackn9;w1p&e 
the f icu l ty  of reaching agreement on the i 
rangements that would he required by more 
measures of armp reduction. Both emphasize the a.vqmqgq .l .T c ,  
of taking such limited steps as can be. agreed upos t . ~  *&- 
or halt the spiraling arms race, to reduce the risks ,gats 
of the arms competition, and to gain experienqe ,in,-op%ra&q, 
systems to regulate arms. Both seek to profit frm -&,e.@wq.m 
tage offered by the possibility of postponing q e  :p-iqre ! far- 
reaching arms reductions, which will either be f@i@&d 
by the grow@ of international codidench or hiliw.w -. . .  
I 
w i l l  posc evere rklu md require onerous inspection ar- 
Thc tmt~ appma4ae-s d i e  in their appakal of the degree 
ob fnrpectka seeded to make +be the partial measures 
of x-ec ! idn  &a approach, which m b  
, emphasizes national : 
touhneg  ob 
it map k mid to be smtegy- 
d a t e d ;  it ten&# rol*qv j.z~pe&o$ ~ g e m ~ ~ , , q x c l u r i v e l y  
in terms of these &q&&d m i t e .  A s@t"emii'bpllbd on ~tlb 
stantial remaining &d6&1 &@biliti& 'aid' nbr be wry 
sensitive to minor d~@d6ns becdtbe they ~ 1 3 : o t  tlweatm 
security and stability.' In'such, i eontext, the inspktioia ryk 1 
tem should W &%9&@ td' dkttfet m i j o ~  ViqIattiok Thh'  
second apprbech d p h w  the politi~2 'cham& of 'cob- 3 
tinuing arm rquhtiosi d thwt'db' fa i n s e r n  &at '1 
will assure p t e r  &w of reassuring ink&matim dlan tht' 1 
. b n t .  - C" j. r I ;1 
ThhC &n & &Q ddob d;~! nado&lLF~rity Ad stable' 1 
&- are, +te 'two qal ingrediw~ of any, iums a ~ n -  j 
m@! ;rack&. b y  inr c t i m  anrogrmg a?ust satisfy'*= 
ti? stijw'dermb pzt q by, e q-GhiplliSp8; appro& However, 'his 
iipmach h q  .&mipp ,whkh need , to I be weighed ,- , 
. " ,  : fuuy* . 8 1 I 
' . I  $or one thing, there is the implicit Western belief that 
minimizing the inspection stand=& in this way makes 
a p m e n t  on first-step reductions more easily negotiable 
with the' 'Soviet Union. This is a logical assumption to make; 
the lw'the system demands, the easier the negotiations should 
be, and the easier for the parties to accept what is required 
of them. The trouble is that neither the record of the post- 
war negotiations nor the Soviet Union's assertions about 
what it wants supports the hypothesis that that country 
would accept inspection designed to fit the minimizing 
rtandvvlr mare readily than the more demanding ins@- 
of the second approach. In faa, the &wiq Uw~,m+&i 
wants neither- Instead it prdaaea ts want m@ 
ment immediately accompanied by 
measures. Thus, despite the apparent 1 
assumption, it has to be awed as unproven. 
the Soviet leaden, and perhaps not even 
they want or would accept when forced to 
Secondly, the underlying asumption o 
approach seems to be that the limits o 
that will not undermine security and s 
assessed and that minimal system ran be d 
that these limits will not be txanrgrossed. P 
But this is a static view of what may be required to 
security and stability aed a h  of the threats &at I&&M 
of agreed arms limitations may p e .  Neither wi& io, kg& 
be unchanging. Thoge who take thc minimhi 
to be sure, make their estimates comervativel 
sizeable margins of error. Neverthelm, the cal 
into account only those asumptiow as to the 
of violation and the nee& of security and sta 
can be made at the moment the calculations are made. Olb* 
ously thb is an unavoida121~ h a r d  of dl p u o j ~ m  of
future needs. But, the possibility that the arsuraptionr will 
be prowd inadequate may suggest that systems 
greater rather than lesser capacities. Of 
assumptions may reduce rather than increase ths 
made on inspection systems. But it will always be easier u) 
discard or decide not to employ capabilities that than 
to agree on installation of new ones not previously mptea 
A more elaborate inspection sywm seems, on the whok 
more likely to respond to unanticipated requiremeats &an 
one that is tailored to minimal standards at the o u ~ t .  ::
Thirdly* criteria ignored by the minimizing approrh' nu)r 
in fact be important both to the creation and the ruoporrfrd 
operation of a m  control systems- Althwgh arms -tax4 
has many important technical components, the bct thaa angia~ 
control will finally be .a political process &a~Zd nepraw-be 
lost sight of. T h e  minimalirt approach may be amrcct ia 
pssnnrirag gtmmmma lPaill; tindi it politkdly .fearible 
for inspection that 
security and smble 
umption, however, in 
Mtes Congressional concern 
eats h r  the nuclear test ban. 
t4Wtm at least, b that for a r m s  
)4b g ~ l l d d ~ ,  d p b l e  they b h p ~ e  to 
-*am& -that ih&&g is tlbt le. The 
'math -b4%mugBW may be c%istmlt 
- p b k  becntstd~eil over the yean to believe 
U't ; he er#mgh.'" Given the climate df suspicion as 
w o~~tiw a&l the widespread belid thaf the USSR 
wi& try dis &cat-and whether &at W&f is conra or not 
d&~%jagt, f~ &b p w p ,  mattm-th'e condition fm Ornit& 
S&.~~:a&eptitace an - arms- control agrrehenrt may well 
&&:g~mment's abilit)i to &ure the p p k  that only 
*light opportunities fof evasion will exist. 
B&ar&pvw, if control systems are to work well and serve 
is pl&tEm from. whioh to l~wnch mare 
~ ~ ~ W B ~ ~ ,  bKpnwi2t 9.oe w setkfy the 
& &@e,&&ia*a"k 
ufdg ~ ~ n c e .  In~pcction itself will 
n discontent and that argues for 
ntid minimum. However, the 
is more likely to benefit from 
*-den dcpedl on the availability to nations of a considerable 
wmdG of deklnble and reassiring information. 
T h e  analysis has revealed another ternion beween, on 
the oae hand, the apparent advan- of atewive interacting 
systerm to inspect intensively a range of arms regulations 
and, on the other, the desirability of identifying individual 
measures on which agreement on soon be reached. Emtun- 
ately, these two desiderata are not mutually exclusiw., If 
the time dimension is introduced, it becomes psib3.f is 
view the selection of individual measures with , which . t~ 
begin the disarmament process as a prerequisite to the in&- 
tution ~f the more elaborate systems. , + 
A third tension has been revedled between the adv-ge~ 
ofimd in many circumstances by reciprocal inspection qb 
tern and the aegotiating emphasis (unbreacbed except for 
the Antarctic Treaty and the recent developments with re 
spect to the test ban) on impartial inspection systems. To 
insist that impartial systems are necessary in all implies 
that the satisfactory working of arms control systems a d  
effective responses to violations depend on the crystallization 
of a broad international consensus, rather than on the view 
taken by the principal parties as to how their national inter- 
ests may k saved. This paper has suggested that the latm 
may be doser to reality thaq the former. Reciprocal system 
deserve much more attention than has been given thm. : 
No one who conscientiously essays to examine the tangled 
skein of difiering, often contradictory, objectives, and tech- 
nical and political considerations that are involved in the 
inspection problem can easily e v e  at any one organizing 
or clarifying principle. T h e  dilemma has surely aillicted the 
pvmments which have had to devise policies to serve na 
tional interests while taking account of the variety of factors 
at play. Is there any policy problem on which government 
policies have shifted more often than they have on m m  
con~ol  in the postwar years? These shifts may be due to the 
vagaries of policy-making, to the impact of changes in key 
personnd, and to the shifting political requiremcntr ob gov- 
ernments as the environment, both domestic anti. intma- 
tional, changes with time. But it i s  just as likely that the 
wavering has been nothing more than an accurate rdkzti.01~ 

the advantages of further testing anti .to accept -bpaction 
arrangements which, however costly and technolagidy 
plex, involve relatively little penewtion of so9ret&Sp]r1 arr 
of national fabrics, compared with the ir~spectiun:&ura; 
at once more extensive and more intensive, calk& fcn:?- 
any bf the first-titage disarmament plans. Ndftker W 
nor the inspection should be unacceptable. Thi$ Gow1d;bs 
particularly m e  if, as is possible, the ment test &es: hPve 
approached exhausting the gains to be achieved by. funha 
immediate testing. If neither side can gain much more 
tests, neither $side rish a great deal in those limited oppbr- 
tunities the other side may have for evading the pr-ip- 
tions. Over the l o w  term, the risks might k saxadwhat 
greater, but even t h a  will remain limited if, as teems *to 
be ,agreed, the only real opportunity for ension will lie in 
smali, costly, underground tests. . .  % . . . 
No doubt the negotiations have been - complicated by  the 
reluctance of the United States to agree to a system rwhichi.6~ 
instituting les~'than.the best conceivable inspection gqmgez 
mats,- seems to set a bad precedent for future .agreeonen@ 
in other spheres. The nuclear test ban is a pilot agrempqt 
and ~h~ultd, therefore, btablish a model for future a&- 
tion. However, to state the problem this way does not mlve 
the question of what principles determine whether a model 
is a good one. , .  , . , , - .  ,?,' : 
One possibility is the.minimalist answer, or some. 
of if, emphasizing the necessity for an inspection capabili.~ 
which, given the environment of strategic and other mlq- 
tionships, provides assurance merely that national mq$q 
and strategic !stability will not be jeopardized. p a t  sw&xyi 
might be met by a test ban inspection system that did,' not 
ensure ,against small underground tests. Or, it mi$&, 
determined that the only good model would be a .sysiejq1 &it 
promised, through high-reliance inspection arraqgiq$p&, fb 
ensure that obligations were being b~filled, Bnd thq=bg 
reduced to a minimum opportunities for fearful ubcertaintjr 
and friction. That decision might, incidentally, lead to tbe 
conclusion that no test ban system is acceptable because hbnd 
that has been considered promises to detect all possible vio- 1 lations. In any event, the system clearly does not have to be '. 
impartial to be a good model for the future. A model should 3 
be asked to meet only functional standards. A reciprocal sys- 
tem, if it met the needs of the test ban, would hardly be a 1 poor precedent for later systems that might or might not , 
call for impartial arrangements. 7 1 
I 
It is not necessarily true that if the great powers cannot / 
agree on this proposed limitation, there is no hope for other 
measures to regulate arms. But the hopes for further progress , 
will surely recede if agreement on the test ban is not forth- 
coming soon. There can be no doubt that the test ban issue i 
is a significant measure of the governments' willingness and 
ability to achieve the kinds of compromises, assuring that 
the irreducible interests of all are protected, which will con: 
front them at every stage of the disarmament process. Failurq 
of the test ban negotiations would properly result in deep 
gloom as to future prospects. D 
There is one hopeful lesson to be derived from the test 
ban negotiations under the auspices of the Eighteen-Nation ' 
Conkrence: the opportunity to expose powers not directl* 
3 
concerned in the test ban negotiationsM to the inspectiox$ 
issues has led to a considerable development of their aware4 
ness of what is at stake. A key to progress in arms negotiation# 
may well be the broad realization that slogans do not solve ' 
disarmament problems. This might foreclose propagan&. 
gains to the USSR and open the path to serious negotiation$ 
on the tough inspection issues among the parties principalljl 
concerned. The Eighteen-Nation Conference has also rd< 
vealed that the lesser powers are well aware that the maid 
issues are those that directly concern the great powers. Thd 
non-aligned participants have demonstrated that they wish: ' 
to help thk great powers to reach their own resolutions oi! 
the issues between them, and also that such resolutions, i& 
they can be reached, will be satisfactory to them. 
MThese take lace in a suboomndttee comprising the United KingdomB 
tbe USSR and t& Unitd States. 
1 'C - -4 T'J 
-1 o sum up ' tbe welght ok the aialyisi and' tb 
r&& simple condusions is not easy. However, the conclu- 
sion seems warranted that small steps must be taken before 
larger ones. Whatever the Soviet Union may 8kjt about hav- 
ing greater first-stage ambitions, it is hard to credit it with 
serious intent unless less demanding first-stage measures in- 
volving more limited inspection burdens prove aci*ptable to 
it. T h e  USSR has every reason to know that the world is not 
ready for the hear foolproof inspection its first-stage . proposals I 
. ' .  
would require. .; ti. ' 
It may be a hopeful omen that, I -  ring the 14&! .f$p,e@ 
Assembly, the USSR indicated it might depart fmm its 
previous position. The suggestion that it would a h  .q 
retention of a "strictly limited and agreed n ~ m b e r ' ' ~  of 
siles is encouraging and certainly deserves serious c " ~ @ q  
tion. But this is a vcry limited concession to the p$ijiic&k 
of stabilized deterrence, particularly since there is no kv& 
dence of a Soviet shift with respect to aircraft on whi* I 
deterrence-still largely depends. Moreover, if the "sarjct'ly 
limited" number is very small, the problem of inspsc*~ 
may be as great as those of inspecting a complete m b i -  
tion, perhaps even greater. 
One of the important tasks confronting the W ~ M  b+'& 
convince the world that partial measures 
beginning toward general and complete d 
h a p  when the Soviet Union ceases to gain p r q w d a  
advantages from the promulgation of slogans, it ,wa &d 
I 
that iai interests call for serious negotiation on l&nM 
measures. ~h . ~ 3 ? 4  .d 
What of 'GP&sion between minimal and more ext-ive 
inspection requirements? From what has preceded it ir cfkr 
that inspection to confirm performance of obligatitms atld 
to provide the greatest possible assurance that all oialdb~% 
be detected is very desirable. On the other W d ,  &&- 
'- 
=set note ~ la$  d.43 L I ,  
w 
iitple&dWiu lac \txa&d, and inspection m m g e s ~ a ~ ~ t s  
sacrifice ,some of the rcaaurarxc 
that the world would be a better place if the heavily unatd 
powerg could r u w = w  negQ~p 9 &$"p" * )O . 
path of armi tedwtih: , ? !  , . I ; % i  y+ j-? i j 
In taking first steps, as in all later stiG-& the +-Grin 
compromisp will be neceuary. In tbc qa#pP 
minimal agreemtmtr pqe to security 8 
tolerable if the measuris that are negoti k 
account of the considerations sketched i p  
of this paper. Saciifichg desirable m k i m  
however, will inevitably pose other, 
minimal agreements will leave great 
standings, friction, public fears and alarm, and deterida~ 
tion of international relationships. If mipimall &x 
to work, governments will have to accept heavy' 
ties to make the& work, and in some reapeas t!h 
sibilities will approximate the conditions th 
asked to meet under arrangements providing 
desirable kinds of irkpxtion. If the bre illl 
by. hbttage agreMneqs is to be consolidated 
govemmentr will have to behave in ways whi 
other governments that the agreements are continuing to 
serve mtional interat < . N, .p 
'Major disarmament will become posible'only ar&&'L ' 
lemir: has bem i k e d  that governmeno whiih6 
disarm have an interest in the greatest 
mation about the disarmament proces 
Rusk wg right when he said that '4~ecrecy 
are fundamentally incompatible." If this 
be art,imlated in fvotstage agreemarts on 
it nevertheless will be unavoidable in the imp 1- of those agreements. In the end, it will have to governments as they contemplate more far-reaching measures. 
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